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Mantel: Tackling the Social Determinants Of Health: A Central Role For Providers

TACKLING THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF
HEALTH: A CENTRAL ROLE FOR PROVIDERS
Jessica Mantel*
Americans’ poor health and high health care costs largely stem
from social, environmental, and behavioral factors that adversely
impact health. Yet, health care providers traditionally have neglected
the social determinants of health, focusing instead on medically
treating patients’ symptoms. As a result, addressing the social
determinants of health has primarily been the domain of government
and community groups. Unfortunately, the efforts of the public health
and social services sectors are stymied by chronic underfunding, a
situation unlikely to change in the current political environment. This
article identifies a potential solution to this problem: recent health
care reforms that encourage health care providers to move beyond
traditional medicine and give greater attention to the social
determinants of poor health. This promising development already has
improved the health of many individuals. However, this trend
represents an incomplete solution to the problem at hand, as
providers lack the incentives and capacity to independently address
many of the root causes of poor health. Effecting far-reaching
changes in the social determinants of health instead will require
providers to join forces with other sectors across a broad range of
initiatives designed to improve the population’s health.
INTRODUCTION
The Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 has profoundly transformed the
United States’ health care system.2 Much of the public’s attention has
*
Assistant Professor, University of Houston Law Center. Thank you to Charity Scott, Dayna Matthews,
Gwendolyn Marquette; participants in the American Association of Law Schools New Scholars
Workshop, the Texas Legal Scholars Workshop, and the University of Houston’s faculty workshop for
their useful discussion and suggestions; and to Emily Lawson and Theresa Langley for their research
assistance.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
2. ANNIE L. MACH & NAMRATA K. UBEROI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43854, OVERVIEW OF
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focused on the ACA’s restructuring of the market for private health
insurance.3 Yet the ACA also fundamentally changes the
organization and delivery of health care. Various reforms encourage
physicians, hospitals, and other health care providers to improve the
quality and efficiency of the clinical care they provide to patients.4
Less appreciated is that these reforms also push providers to expand
their attention beyond the clinical care setting. Rather than simply
diagnosing and treating disease, providers increasingly are taking
steps to address the social, environmental, and behavioral factors
impacting their patients’ health.5 This Article examines this recent
trend and concludes that while providers’ efforts to address these
upstream causes of poor health is an encouraging development, more
must be done to strengthen providers’ incentives and capacity to do
so. Ultimately, successfully tackling the root causes of poor health
will require providers to collaborate with government agencies,
schools, social services providers, community groups, and others that
share the goal of improving their community’s health.
Despite the United States having arguably the world’s best
biomedical research and specialty medical care, we consistently lag
behind other developed countries in life expectancy and on other
health outcome measures.6 Americans’ poor health poses significant
PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE PROVISIONS IN THE PATIETN PROTECTION AND AFFORADABLE CARE ACT
1 (2016).
3. See id. at 2.
4. See infra Part III.A.
5. Id.
6. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD HEALTH STATISTICS 2015,
http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/health-data.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2016) [hereinafter OECD
HEALTH STATISTICS 2015]; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD HEALTH STATISTICS 2015:
FREQUENTLY REQUESTED DATA http://www.oecd.org/health/health-systems/OECD-Health-Statistics2015-Frequently-Requested-Data.xls [hereinafter OECD FREQUENTLY REQUESTED DATA 2015]
(comparing health measurements across the thirty-four countries in the OECD). According to the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the average life expectancy at
birth in the United States in 2013 was 78.8 years, which falls below the 80.5 year average for all OECD
countries and is higher than only seven of the thirty-four OECD countries. OECD FREQUENTLY
REQUESTED DATA 2015, supra. Infant mortality in 2013 stood at 5.0 deaths per 1000 as compared to an
average of 3.8 across OECD countries. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., Health at a Glance
2015: OECD Indicators 59 (2015), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/socialissues-migration-health/health-at-a-glance-2015_health_glance-2015-en#.V7HkSUbYiIg#page3
(last
visted Aug. 22, 2016). And, among OECD nations, the United States has one of the highest levels of
potential years of life lost due to poor health. See OECD FREQUENTLY REQUESTED DATA 2015, supra.
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human costs. Americans increasingly suffer from preventable chronic
illnesses such as cancer, heart disease, and diabetes,7 with experts
predicting that the incidence of such diseases will continue to
increase.8 Indeed, the current generation of children and young adults
are in danger of becoming the first generation to experience “shorter,
less healthy lives than their parents.”9
The population’s poorer health also has contributed to rising health
care costs.10 The health care sector accounted for 17.5% of the U.S.
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014, as compared to only 5.2% in
1960.11 Economists project that health care will comprise as much as
one-third of GDP by 2040.12 In the face of growing health care
expenditures, health care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid
consume a growing portion of federal government outlays13 and have
See generally OECD HEALTH STATISTICS 2015, supra.
7. See JEFFREY LEVI ET AL., TR. FOR AM.’S HEALTH, INVESTING IN AMERICA’S HEALTH: A STATEBY-STATE LOOK AT PUBLIC HEALTH FUNDING AND KEY HEALTH FACTS 1 (2011),
http://healthyamericans.org/assets/files/Investing%20in%20America’s%20Health.pdf.
8. See Thomas Bodenheimer, Ellen Chen & Heather D. Bennett, Confronting the Growing Burden
of Chronic Disease: Can the U.S. Health Care Workforce Do the Job?, 28 HEALTH AFF. 64, 64 (2009)
(summarizing projections for increases in chronic conditions, including diabetes and chronic mental
disorders); Carlos O. Weiss et al., Patterns of Prevalent Major Chronic Disease in Older Adults in the
United States, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1160, 1161 (2007) (reporting that the number of people with
chronic disease is expected to increase steadily in the United States for the next 30 years).
9. See LEVI ET AL., supra note 7; see INST. OF MED., FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: INVESTING IN A
HEALTHIER FUTURE 20 (2012), [hereinafter FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH] (discussing the lack of
progress in preventing poor health).
10. See FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9, at 17.
11. See National Health Expenditure Data, Historical, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/
nationalhealthexpenddata/nationalhealthaccountshistorical.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2016). In 2011, the
percentage of the U.S. GDP devoted to health care spending (17.7%) was approximately 6% above the
next group of countries and far exceeded the average across OECD nations (9.3%). See HEALTH AT A
GLANCE 2013: OECD INDICATORS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 156, 209 (2013),
http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Health-at-a-Glance-2013.pdf.
12. See Peter J. Kalis & Judy Hlafcsak, Healthcare Reform: Let’s Act Locally, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 253,
257 (2012) (stating that healthcare “is projected to reach 34% [of GDP] by 2040, if costs continue to
grow at historic rates”) (citing EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, THE
ECONOMIC CASE FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM (2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/
CEA_Health_Care_Report.pdf).
13. See CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, UPDATED BUDGET PROJECTIONS: 2014 TO 2024, at 3 tbl. 1,
6–7
tbl.
2
(2014),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45229UpdatedBudgetProjections_2.pdf. CBO estimates that federal government outlays for health care—
Medicare, Medicaid, State Children’s Health Insurance Program (“SCHIP”), and other federal health
care programs—cost an estimated $861 billion in fiscal year 2013, almost 25% of total federal
government outlays estimated at $3.455 trillion. See id.
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strained state budgets,14 threatening to crowd out other priorities such
as education, crime prevention, transportation, and welfare.15 In
addition, rising insurance premiums make U.S. companies less
competitive internationally16 and have contributed to stagnant
wages.17 A less healthy population also shrinks the labor supply and
reduces worker productivity,18 which experts estimate diminishes
economic output in the United States by over $1 trillion annually.19
Given these challenges, policymakers have given enormous
attention to increasing the quality and efficiency of the health care
system. For the most part, these efforts have focused on doing better
in the clinical setting, such as improving coordination among
providers and avoiding unnecessary or duplicative services.20 While
these efforts certainly are important, they do little to address a key
driver of higher health care spending—the rising prevalence of
chronic diseases.
A recent study estimates that 77.6% of the growth in health care
spending from 1987 to 2011 was associated with the treatment of
chronic disease, particularly among those with four or more chronic
conditions.21 While this growth in spending in part reflects
14. See David A. Squires, Issues in International Health Policy—Explaining High Health Care
Spending in the United States: An International Comparison of Supply, Utilization, Prices, and Quality,
10 THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 11 (2012) (“Medicaid spending also impacts state budgets,
increasing faster than and potentially crowding out other socially desirable budget items, such as
education and infrastructure.”).
15. See BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., WHAT IS DRIVING UNITED STATES HEALTH CARE SPENDING?:
AMERICA’S UNSUSTAINABLE HEALTH CARE COST GROWTH 4 (2012), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/
farm/reports/issue_briefs/2012/rwjf401339.
16. See id. But see Henry J. Aaron, Should Public Policy Seek to Control the Growth of Health Care
Spending?, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 8, 2003 at W3-28, W3-29 (stating that rising employer-financed health
care costs do not reduce corporate profits but instead “eat into workers’ earnings”).
17. See Russell Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice Architecture: The
Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Health Care Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L. REV. 523, 525
(2014); Aaron, supra note 16, at W3-29.
18. See FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9, at 17 (“The indirect costs associated with
preventable chronic disease—costs related to diminished labor supply and worker productivity and the
resulting fiscal drag on the nation’s economic output—has been estimated at over $1 trillion a year.”
(citation omitted)). Lower productivity results from lost work time and diminished performance due to
illness. See id. at 19.
19. See id. at 17.
20. See generally Jessica Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat
It Too?, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1393 (2012).
21. See Kenneth E. Thorpe, Lindsay Allen & Peter Joski, The Role of Chronic Disease, Obesity, and

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol33/iss2/1

4

Mantel: Tackling the Social Determinants Of Health: A Central Role For Providers

2017]

TACKLING SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH

221

population growth and higher treatment costs, approximately 30% is
attributable to the rising incidence of chronic illnesses such as heart
disease, diabetes, hypertension, and asthma.22 Today, over half of
adults in the United States have at least one chronic condition, with a
quarter having two or more conditions.23
The increased incidence of chronic diseases stems largely from
Americans’ tobacco use, insufficient physical activity, and poor
diet.24 While many in society blame individuals for these unhealthy
behaviors, the behaviors do not occur in a vacuum; rather, they are
shaped in part by individuals’ physical and social environments.25
For example, unsafe neighborhoods and lack of green space limit the
opportunities for exercise.26 Stress associated with financial and other
personal challenges contributes to overeating and substance abuse.27
Physical and social factors also directly impact health, such as
exposing individuals to toxic substances.28 Together these factors, the
so-called social determinants of health, account for 60% of the risk of
premature death due to chronic disease and other health conditions.29
Improved Treatment and Detection in Accounting for the Rise in Healthcare Spending Between 1987
and 2011, 13 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. HEALTH POL’Y 381, 381 (2015).
22. See id. at 384–85.
23. See Ursula E. Bauer et al., Prevention of Chronic Disease in the 21st Century: Elimination of the
Leading Preventable Causes of Premature Death and Disability in the USA, 384 LANCET 45, 45 (2014).
24. See id. at 46 (stating that in the USA chronic diseases largely result from risk factors that include
tobacco use, poor diet and physical inactivity). For example, Thorpe, Allen, and Joski estimate that
between 11.4 and 23.5% of the increase in healthcare expenditures for specific chronic conditions from
1987 to 2011 can be explained by rising obesity levels. See Thorpe, Allen & Joski, supra note 21, at
381.
25. See Paula Braveman, Susan Egerter & David R. Williams, The Social Determinants of Health:
Coming of Age, 32 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 381, 383–84 (2010) (“[U]pstream determinants related to
living and working conditions . . . can influence health both directly (e.g., through toxics exposures or
stressful experiences) and indirectly (by shaping the health-related choices that individual have and
make for themselves and their families).”).
26. See ACTIVE LIVING BY DESIGN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., LOW INCOME POPULATIONS
AND PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 2 (2012), http://www.bms.com/documents/together_on_diabetes/2012Summit-Atlanta/Physical-Activity-for-Low-Income-Populations-The-Health-Trust.pdf;
Braveman, Egerter & Williams, supra note 25, at 383–84.
27. See ACTIVE LIVING BY DESIGN, supra note 26; Braveman, Egerter & Williams, supra note 25, at
383–84.
28. See Braveman, Egerter & Williams, supra note 25, at 383–84.
29. See Sandra Braunstein & Risa Lavizzo-Mourey, How the Health and Community Development
Sectors Are Combining Forces to Improve Health and Well-Being, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2042, 2043 (2011);
MAIA CRAWFORD ET AL., MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND., POPULATION HEALTH IN MEDICAID DELIVERY
SYSTEM REFORMS 2 (2015), http://www.milbank.org/uploads/documents/papers/
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So although though improving the delivery of health care is an
important goal, health experts have concluded that ameliorating the
social, environmental, and behavioral conditions that contribute to
chronic disease holds even greater promise for enhancing the
population’s health and constraining health care spending.30
Despite the enormous impact social, environmental, and
behavioral factors have on health, the vast bulk of health care
spending in the United States goes toward the diagnosis and
treatment of disease.31 Chronic shortfalls in public health and social
services programs that target the social determinants of health have
become the norm.32 Unfortunately, the status quo will remain
unchanged for the foreseeable future, as elected officials and the
public are unlikely to support increased funding for public health and
social services. This Article identifies an alternative solution to this
problem that bypasses the political budgeting process: incentivizing
health care providers to allocate a portion of their resources to
addressing the nonclinical determinants of health.
In response to reforms adopted under the ACA, providers
increasingly are turning their attention to the nonclinical factors that
adversely affect their patients’ health.33 This emerging trend
promises to both improve health and lower health care spending in
the United States.34 Unfortunately, this trend, in its current form, is
only a partial solution to the nation’s neglect of the upstream causes
of poor health, as providers lack the capacity and incentives to
CHCS_PopulationHealth_IssueBrief.pdf. An additional 10% of preventable deaths is attributable to
shortfalls in medical care, with the remaining 30% attributable to genetic predispositions. See id.; see
also Bridget C. Broske, et al., Different Perspectives for Assigning Weights to Determinants of Health 1
(Univ. of Wisconsin Population Health Inst., Working Paper, February 2010) (reviewing different
approaches to weighting the relative contribution to health outcomes of different factors, and
recommending a weighting scheme that assigns 80% to social and economic factors, health behaviors,
and environmental factors, with 20% assigned to clinical care).
30. See Johnson, infra note 63.
31. See generally FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9, at 20–29 (generally describing the
imbalance between spending on clinical care and spending on prevention and population health, and
noting that “the bulk of [U.S Department Health and Human Services] funding goes to publicly funded
clinical care (through Medicaid and Medicare) and to the National Institutes of Health, largely for basic
research, little of it for primary prevention and even less for population-based interventions.”).
32. See Johnson, infra note 63.
33. See discussion supra Part III.
34. Id.
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address the full range of factors impacting health. Far-reaching
improvement in the nation’s health ultimately requires that the health
care system integrate medical, public health, and social services.
Providers, therefore, should be encouraged to combine their
resources and expertise with other sectors in pursuit of shared
community health goals, arrangements that I refer to as Population
Health Partnerships. Toward this end, policymakers must implement
policies that promote the development of sustainable Population
Health Partnerships.
Part I discusses the causal link between social, environmental, and
behavioral factors and individuals’ health. Part I also highlights the
chronic underfunding of public programs that address these factors.
Part II then explains that various political and social dynamics pose
significant barriers to those advocating for increased funding for
public health and social services programs. Consequently, chronic
underfunding of these programs will continue.
Part III presents a possible solution to this problem—encouraging
the health care system to reach beyond its traditional clinical
boundaries and into the public health and social services realms. Part
III also describes how current reimbursement and tax policies nudge
providers down this path. Part IV identifies the benefits of providers
addressing the upstream causes of poor health, but also sounds a
more pessimistic note and explains why this trend is only a partial
solution to America’s underfunding of public health and social
services programs. Specifically, Part IV argues that providers will
narrowly focus on improving the near-term health of individual
patients and not on long-term improvements to the health of the
community at-large.
Ultimately, enduring success in tackling the root causes of poor
health will require that providers work collectively with one another
and with other sectors. Part V describes these so-called Population
Health Partnerships, identifies existing hurdles to their formation, and
calls for the development of public policies and infrastructure that
will lower these hurdles.
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I. THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND BEHAVIORAL
FACTORS ON HEALTH
Advances in medicine have helped patients live longer and have
improved their quality of life. Yet, despite the clear link between
medical care and health, experts estimate that access to medical care
prevents only 10% of premature deaths.35 A growing body of
literature suggests that social, environmental, and behavioral factors
play an even bigger role in determining an individual’s health,36
accounting for 60% of the risk of premature death.37 Those facing
greater social disadvantage are particularly at risk of poor health.38
The social determinants of health (SDHs) are the nonmedical
factors that impact an individual’s health status.39 They encompass
“the conditions in which people are born, grow up, live, work and
age,”40 including “income and wealth, family and household
structure, social support and isolation, education, occupation,
discrimination, neighborhood conditions, and social institutions,
35. See CRAWFORD ET AL., supra note 29, at 2; Braunstein & Lavizzo-Mourey, supra note 29, at
2043.
36. See David A. Asch & Kevin G. Volpp, What Business Are We In? The Emergence of Health as
the Business of Health Care, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 888, 888 (2012) (“An enormous body of literature
supports the view that differences in health are determined as much by the social circumstances that
underlie them as by the biologic processes that mediate them.”); John V. Jacobi, Multiple Medicaid
Missions: Targeting, Universalism, or Both?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 89, 97 (2015)
(“[Nonmedical factors] can be more powerfully determinative of the health of a population than the
delivery of traditional health services.”).
37. See CRAWFORD ET AL., supra note 29, at 2; Braunstein & Lavizzo-Mourey, supra note 29, at
2043. With 70% of preventable deaths attributable to access to medical care and the social determinants
of health, the remaining 30% is attributable to genetic predispositions. See CRAWFORD ET AL., supra
note 29, at 2.
38. See Braveman, Egerter & Williams, supra note 25, at 384 (“Evidence from decades of research
examining associations between key social factors—primarily educational attainment and income in the
United States and occupational grade (ranking) in Europe—and health outcomes throughout the life
course overwhelmingly links greater social disadvantage with poorer health.”).
39. WORLD HEALTH ORG., SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH: KEY CONCEPTS (2016),
http://www.who.int/social_determinants/thecomission/finalreport/key_concepts/en/.
40. Id. The WHO definition also includes “the systems put in place to deal with illness.” Id. For
purposes of this article, however, I exclude the traditional health care system as a social determinant of
health. Cf. Adina Preda & Kristin Voigt, The Social Determinants of Health: Why Should We Care?, 15
AM. J. BIOETHICS 25, 26 (2015) (defining a social determinant as “‘a socially controllable factor outside
the traditional health care system that is an independent partial cause of an individuals’ health status’”
(quoting Gopal Sreenivasan, Justice, Inequality, and Health, STANFORD ENCYLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(2008))).
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among others.”41 As described below, these factors impact
individuals’ health in three ways: (1) they affect an individual’s
ability to access traditional medical care, (2) they directly impact an
individual’s physical or mental health, and (3) they support or
constrain an individual’s capacity to follow healthy behaviors.42
Various financial and nonfinancial factors influence whether
individuals receive appropriate medical care in a timely manner.
Financial considerations such as lack of health insurance, inability to
pay cost-sharing obligations, or plans refusing to pay for care lead
some individuals to delay or forego needed medical care.43 While the
insurance reforms and subsidies put in place by the ACA lower these
barriers, they do not completely eliminate them.44 Nonfinancial
factors including transportation challenges,45 lack of paid sick
leave,46 and an inability to arrange for child care during appointment
41. LAURA MCGOVERN, GEORGE MILLER & PAUL HUGHES-CROMWICK, HEALTH AFF., HEALTH
POLICY BRIEF: THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTION OF MULTIPLE DETERMINANTS TO HEALTH OUTCOMES 2
(2014), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_123.pdf.
42. See Geoffrey R. Swain et al., Health Care Professionals: Opportunities to Address Social
Determinants of Health, 113 WIS. MED. J. 218, 218 (2014) (describing the different types of social
determinants affecting health).
43. See Jeffrey T. Kullgren et al., Nonfinancial Barriers and Access to Care for U.S. Adults, 47
HEALTH SERVS. RES. 462, 465, 467 (2007) (reporting the results of a survey finding that “barriers in the
affordability dimension were the most common reasons for unmet need or delayed care”).
44. See Benjamin D. Sommers, Health Care Reform’s Unfinished Work – Remaining Barriers to
Coverage and Access, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2395, 2395–96 (2015) (stating that for people with higher
incomes who do not qualify for subsidies under ACA, cost remains a significant barrier to obtaining
health insurance, and, even among insured individuals, high cost-sharing can limit access to timely and
affordable care).
45. See Kullgren et al., supra note 43, at 470 (identifying transportation problems as a reason for
unmet need or delayed care); Richard Wallace et al., Access to Health Care and Nonemergency Medical
Transportation: Two Missing Links, 1924 J. TRANSP. RES. BOARD 76, 76 (2005) (reporting that
approximately 3.6 million Americans do not obtain medical care in a given year because of lack of
transportation).
46. See KEVIN MILLER, CLAUDIA WILLIAMS & YOUNGMIN YI, INST. WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH,
PAID SICK DAYS AND HEALTH: COST SAVINGS FROM REDUCED EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT VISITS 3
(2011), http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/paid-sick-days-and-health-cost-savings-from-reducedemergency-department-visits (finding that “workers with paid sick days are less likely to delay seeking
care for themselves and their famil[ies]”). For example:
The percentage of workers who underwent mammography, Pap tests, [and]
endoscopies at recommended intervals, who had seen a doctor during the previous
twelve months, or who had at least one visit to a health care provider during the
previous twelve months was significantly higher among those with paid sick
leave as compared to those without sick leave [even] after controlling for
sociodemographic and health-care-related factors.
See Lucy A. Pepins et al., The Lack of Paid Sick Leave as a Barrier to Cancer Screening and Medical
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times47 may also lead patients to delay or forego medical care.
Families with a limited ability to speak English face the additional
challenge of navigating a health care system in which many providers
do not provide interpreter services.48 Finally, cultural considerations,
such as a stigma against mental illness and HIV, lead some
individuals to forego needed care.49
Physical environmental risks also directly affect individuals’
physiology. Exposure to hazardous chemicals, lead paint, mold, dust,
or pest infestation in the workplace or home can harm individuals’
health.50 For example, individuals exposed to microbial or toxic
agents are at higher risk for infections, cancer, neurological
problems, and cardiovascular, respiratory, liver, kidney, and bladder
disease.51 Similarly, stress from coping with demanding jobs, job
loss, economic hardship, unsafe neighborhoods, racism, or other
challenges can lead to psychological conditions and damage immune
defenses, vital organs, and physiological systems.52
Care-Seeking: Results from the National Health Interview Survey, 12 BMC PUB. HEALTH 520, 523–24
(2012), http://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2458-12-520.
47. See Jason R. Woloski et al., Childcare Responsibilities and Women’s Medical Care, 3 J.
WOMENS HEALTH, ISSUES & CARE 1, 4–5 (linking foregoing and delaying care to logistically challenges
associated with childcare responsibilities).
48. See Yael Schenker et al., Patterns of Interpreter Use for Hospitalized Patients with Limited
English Proficiency, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 712, 712 (2011) (finding that although the use of
professional interpreters improves the quality of care and patient outcomes for hospital patients with
limited English proficiency, the use of professional interpreters was infrequent).
49. See Margaret A. Chesney & Ashley W. Smith, Critical Delays in HIV Testing and Care: The
Potential Role of Stigma, 42 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1162, 1162 (1999) (discussing the impact that
HIV-related stigma has on HIV testing and care); Laysha Ostrow, Ron Manderscheid & Ramin
Mojtabai, Stigma and Difficulty Accessing Medical Care in a Sample of Adults with Serious Mental
Illness, 25 J. HEALTH CARE POOR UNDERSERVED 1956, 1956, 1959 (2014) (reporting that in a survey of
adults with mental illness, 13% attributed difficulties in accessing medical care to stigma).
50. See Braveman, Egerter & Williams, supra note 25, at 385–86 (discussing the impact of the
physical aspects of neighborhoods, housing, and the workplace on health).
51. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Restoring Health to Health Reform: Integrating Medicine and
Public Health to Advance the Population’s Well-Being, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1777, 1794 (2011)
(discussing the conditions caused by exposure to microbial or toxic agents).
52. See Braveman, Egerter & Williams, supra note 25, at 385, 388 (noting the impact of stress
generally and the association between poor health and workers in jobs characterized by high demands
and low control); Patti Neighmond, People with Low Incomes Say They Pay a Price in Poor Health,
NPR (Mar. 2, 2015, 4:05 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/03/02/389347123/peoplewith-low-incomes-say-they-pay-a-price-in-poor-health (reporting that surveys and studies suggest that
lower-paying jobs and unemployment harms health, increasing the risk for conditions such as stroke,
heart disease, diabetes, and emotional or psychiatric conditions).
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Living and working conditions also indirectly impact individuals’
health by shaping their health-related behaviors. Economic and
environmental circumstances can contribute to a poor diet and
insufficient physical activity.53 Many individuals consume less
healthy foods because they either cannot afford or lack access to
healthier options, increasing their risk for obesity or malnutrition.54
Similarly, hospitals have observed a spike in admissions for
hypoglycemia among low-income diabetics during the last week of
the month, when SNAP allocations are exhausted.55 Studies also
show that advertising can affect children’s eating habits, and that
these habits often last a lifetime.56 Finally, unsafe neighborhoods or
lack of green space limit opportunities for exercise.57 The resulting
poor diets and lack of exercise increase individuals’ risk for chronic
diseases such as cancer and cardiovascular disease.58
Living and working conditions influence other health-related
behaviors as well.59 For example, financial problems, unstable
housing, and safety concerns cause stress, which in turn can lead
individuals to engage in harmful behaviors such as smoking and
53. See generally Ross C. Brownson et al., Environmental and Policy Determinants of Physical
Activity in the United States, 12 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1995 (2001).
54. See Michele Ver Ploeg, Access to Affordable, Nutritious Food is Limited in “Food Deserts”,
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2010-march/access-toaffordable,-nutritious-food-is-limited-in-%E2%80%9Cfood-deserts%E2%80%9D.aspx#.VrZbCtIrJhE
(explaining that “food deserts” are neighborhoods where residents do not live near supermarkets or other
food retailers that carry affordable and nutritious food, and that they instead rely on smaller stores that
often do not carry healthy foods and/or charge higher prices); see also Neighmond, supra note 52, at 2
(profiling the story of Anna Beer, who after losing her job could no longer afford fresh fruits,
vegetables, and poultry and instead purchased less expensive canned and frozen foods with more salt
and preservatives, which she believed had contributed to her deteriorating health).
55. See Hilary K. Seligman, Exhaustion of Food Budgets at Month’s End and Hospital Admissions
for Hypoglycemia, 33 HEALTH AFF. 116, 116 (2014), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/33/1/116.
56. See FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9, at 29 (discussing the impact of advertising on
children’s eating habits).
57. See Gary G. Bennett et al., Safe to Walk? Neighborhood Safety and Physical Activity Among
Public Housing Residents, 4 PLOS MED. 1599, 1599 (2007) (discussing the connection between
neighborhood safety and physical activity); Brownson et al., supra note 53, at 1994 (finding
neighborhood characteristics such as sidewalks, enjoyable scenery, and heavy traffic were positively
correlated with physical activity).
58. See James Corbett & Manel Kappagoda, Doing Good and Doing Well: Corporate Social
Responsibility in Post Obamacare America, 41 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 17, 17 (2013) (stating that physical
activity and poor diet, along with tobacco use, are leading causes of death and are linked to increased
incidences of a wide range of chronic diseases).
59. See id.

Published by Reading Room, 2017

11

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 1

228

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:2

substance abuse in an effort to self-medicate or self-soothe.60 Studies
also have found that higher levels of education are associated with
healthier behaviors and earlier compliance with health-related
recommendations.61 Experts believe this finding may reflect bettereducated individuals having greater health knowledge and being
more adept at managing medical care for themselves and their
families.62
As these examples illustrate, chronic health conditions are largely
the downstream result of social, economic, and environmental
circumstances. For many health conditions, “the latest and best
medicine in the world” will do little to improve patients’ health if we
“send them back to live in the same conditions that made them sick
in the first place.”63 A national strategy to improve health therefore
must include investments in prevention and wellness initiatives that
ameliorate the upstream causes of preventable diseases.64 Spending
more on public health65 and social services66 also makes economic
60. Fred C. Pampel et al., Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Behaviors, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 349,
353 (2010) (explaining that “[t]hose deprived economically and living in disadvantaged neighborhoods
face a variety of chronic stressors” that may lead to smoking and other unhealthy behaviors in an
attempt to cope or self-medicate); see Sue A. Kaplan et al., The Perception of Stress and its Impact on
Health in Poor Communities, 38 J. CMTY. HEALTH 142, 142 (2013) (reporting the results of focus
groups examining how low income individuals perceive stress and how their perceptions relate to
health).
61. See Braveman, Egerter & Williams, supra note 25, at 386 (discussing the association between
education and health).
62. See id.
63. Steven Ross Johnson, Getting to the Root of the Problem, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 1, 2014),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140201/MAGAZINE/302019986 (quoting David Williams,
a professor of public health at Harvard University).
64. See LEVI ET AL., supra note 7, at 1, 3 (“Investing in disease prevention is the most effective,
common-sense way to improve health—helping to spare millions of Americans from developing
preventable illnesses . . . .”); Jeffrey Levi et al., The Need to Increase Funding for Public Health, in
SHORTCHANGING AMERICA’S HEALTH: A STATE-BY-STATE LOOK AT HOW FEDERAL PUBLIC HEALTH
DOLLARS ARE SPENT AND KEY STATE HEALTH FACTS 3, 3 (Trust for America’s Health, 2009)
[hereinafter Levi, Increase Funding] (“Funding public health programs is essential to improving the
health and the productivity of the nation’s workforce . . . .”).
65. The term “public health” refers to activities that protect and improve the health of populations, as
opposed to individuals, through the promotion of healthy lifestyles, research for disease and injury
prevention, and the detection and control of infectious diseases. What is Public Health?, CDC FOUND.,
http://www.cdcfoundation.org/content/what-public-health (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
66. For purposes of this article, “social services” include education, support services for older adults,
survivor benefits, disability and sickness benefits, family supports, housing programs, employment
programs, unemployment benefits, and similar programs other than those that pay for medical care. Cf.
MCGOVERN, MILLER & HUGHES-CROMWICK, supra note 41, at 1 (defining social services).
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sense because society can “reduce the need for advanced, costly
medical care” by “addressing the root causes of disease and
injuries.”67
Despite the importance of investing in the upstream causes of poor
health, the United States has primarily directed its resources
downstream on treatment of illness.68 For 2013, per capita spending
on health care in the United States exceeded the average among
OECD nations by two-and-a-half times and was more than one-third
higher than the next largest spending country.69 But a comparison of
countries’ combined investment in health care and social services
reveals that the United States ranks only tenth among developed
countries.70 This result stems largely from the fact that, while other
67. FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9, at 21; see also Gostin et al., supra note 51, at 1785
(“[E]ffective public health ‘reduces the need for medical services to treat conditions that can be
prevented, thereby helping to control costs and make personal health care affordable.’” (quoting Thomas
G. Rundall, The Integration of Public Health and Medicine, 10 FRONTIERS HEALTH SERVICES MGMT. 3,
9 (1994))); MCGOVERN, MILLER & HUGHES-CROMWICK, supra note 41, at 6 (“[A]s the literature
suggests, . . . the multilevel promotion and adoption of health behaviors stands to reap the most ‘bang’
for our health care ‘buck.’”). For example, a recent evaluation of the Tips from Former Smokers
Campaign found that the campaign helped 100,000 people to successfully quit smoking immediately,
preventing more than 17,000 premature deaths. Evaluators estimated a cost of $480 per quitter with a
$2,800 return in premature death averted. See LEVI ET AL., supra note 7, at 12 (discussing key programs
funded under the Prevention Health and Health Services Block Grants). But see Preda & Voigt, supra
note 40, at 32-33 (questioning whether the existence of a link between a social, economic, or
environmental conditions and health means interventions targeting such conditions will improve health
and lower health care costs).
While a comprehensive description of public health and social interventions addressing the social
determinants of health is beyond the scope of this article, some illustrative examples include the
following:
 Keeping schools open after hours so children can play with adult supervision;
 Making nutritious foods more affordable and accessible to low-income areas;
 Providing young parents with information about how to make good choices about nutrition;
 Creating more safe spaces for physical activity;
 Offering counseling and proven pharmacological treatments for people trying to quit smoking
and other tobacco use;
 Raising taxes on cigarettes and other tobacco products;
 Providing transportation services to and from heath care providers;
 Providing financial help in paying any cost-sharing for medical care; and
 Improving the quality of housing stock and enforcing housing standards.
See generally Levi, Increase Funding, supra note 64, at 4.
68. See Kelly M. Doran, Elizabeth J. Misa & Nirav R. Shah, Housing as Health Care – New York’s
Boundary-Crossing Experiment, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2374, 2374 (2013).
69. See OECD FREQUENTLY REQUESTED DATA 2015, supra note 6.
70. See id.; Kenneth Davis, To Lower the Cost of Health Care, Invest in Social Services, HEALTH
AFF. BLOG (July 14, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/07/14/to-lower-the-cost-of-health-careinvest-in-social-services/ (arguing that the U.S. health care system delivers disappointing results because
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developed countries generally spend two dollars on social services
for each dollar spent on medical care, the United States spends only
fifty cents on social services for every dollar spent on medical care.71
According to the Institute of Medicine, the “shortfalls in educational
achievement[] and lack of investment in and policy attention to other
social factors known to have favorable effects on health” explain, in
part, the United States’s poor performance among OECD nations on
most health outcome measures.72
The growing recognition that the United States spends too much
on medical care and too little on SDHs has led to calls for
government to correct this imbalance.73 Unfortunately, for the
reasons discussed in Part II, government investment in public health
and social services likely will remain insufficient for the foreseeable
future.

other developed nations invest substantially more in social services that impact health, which leads them
to do a “far better job than the United States in preventing their vulnerable populations from suffering
serious illness”); Jennifer DeCubellis & Leon Evans, Investing in the Social Safety Net: Health Care’s
Next Frontier, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 7, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/07/07/investing-inthe-social-safety-net-health-cares-next-frontier/.
71. See DeCubellis & Evans, supra note 70.
72. See FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9, at 13, 33 (noting that the United States has fallen
behind its global counterparts on health outcomes, and that a “fundamental but often overlooked driver
of the imbalance between spending and outcomes is the nation’s inadequate investment in nonclinical
strategies that promote health and prevent disease and injury population-wide”); see also JOE ALPER &
ALINA BACIU, INST. OF MED., FINANCING POPULATION HEATH IMPROVEMENT: WORKSHOP SUMMARY
1 (2015).
The Institute of Medicine’s assertion that the United States’s low rankings on health outcomes is due in
part to its failure to devote sufficient resources to the broader determinants of health finds support in
studies comparing spending across European nations and across states. See FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH,
supra note 9, at 26. The European studies found a relationship between a nation’s population health
status and its national investment in social programs related to employment and income protection. See
id. Specifically, European countries with the lowest levels of social spending had the poorest outcomes,
while the Scandinavian countries, with their larger social safety nets, topped the rankings. See id.
Similarly, within the United States, states with a higher ratio social to health spending had better health
outcomes on a range of population health measures, including lower adult obesity, fewer mentally
unhealthy days and days with activity limitations, and lower mortality rates for lung cancer, acute
myocardial infarctions, and type 2 diabetes. See Elizabeth Bradley et al., Variation in Health Outcomes:
The Role of Spending on Social Services, Public Health, and Health Care, 2000-09, 34 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 760, 764 (2016).
73. See, e.g., FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9 (arguing for greater investment in public
health); Gostin et al., supra note 51, at 1814–15, 1820 (stating that the United States overinvests in
treating disease and underinvests in public health).
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II. AMERICA’S NEGLECT OF THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH
Advocates have long bemoaned what they perceive as chronic
underfunding of public health and social services programs that
address the upstream causes of poor health.74 Weak support for such
programs stems from a range of political and social factors: a
fragmented budgeting process for government spending; a media that
focuses on immediate threats to health; health benefits that lack
visibility and accrue in a distant future; an American culture that
highly values autonomy and self-responsibility; and interest group
politics.75 Unfortunately, these factors will continue to create a
political climate hostile to increased funding for public health and
social services programs that promote prevention and healthy living.
Public health advocates justify calls for greater investment in
public health and social services on cost-benefit grounds, arguing that
reducing the social impediments to good health will “reap the most
‘bang’ for our health care ‘buck.’”76 Unfortunately, the public
budgeting process does not prioritize government programs based on
cross-sector cost-benefit calculations. First, as explained by Nicole
Lurie, “calculating the savings that might accrue from spending in
one program (such as education) to another (such as health) is at best
an imperfect science, . . . and making budgeting decisions based on
such calculations is extremely difficult.”77 Consequently, such

74. See, e.g., GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41823, LOW-INCOME ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS:
TRENDS IN FEDERAL SPENDING (2014) (summarizing Congressional Budget Office estimates and
finding that while federal spending on low-income programs other than health increased between 2010
and 2011 due to the recession, such spending has decreased in recent years and will decline through
2024 under current law); FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9 (bemoaning the chronic
underfunding of public health); Ife Floyd & Liz Schott, TANF Cash Benefits Have Fallen by More Than
20 Percent in Most States and Continue to Erode, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Oct. 30,
2014),
http://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/tanf-cash-benefits-have-fallen-by-morethan-20-percent-in-most-states (stating that inflation-adjusted cash assistance to poor families with
children has fallen in purchasing power at least 20% since their 1996 levels in 38 states, after having
declined by 40% between 1970 and 1996 in two-thirds of states).
75. See FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9, at 27–28.
76. MCGOVERN, MILLER & HUGHES-CROMWICK, supra note 41, at 6.
77. Id. at 102–03.
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calculations can be easily challenged by those benefitting from the
status quo.78
Second, even if cross-sector savings calculations could be done
with reasonable precision, governments’ siloed approach to
appropriations does not promote policymakers taking such savings
into account. Congress and state legislatures typically adopt budgets
for different sectors in separate bills drafted by separate legislative
committees.79 For example, the bill establishing the federal or state
health budget may be considered by a different committee than the
one considering the education, housing, and agricultural budgets.80
With each committee focused on the policy issues affecting the
sectors under its jurisdiction, non-health related committees generally
lack an awareness of or interest in how their decisions impact health
care spending.81 Similarly, local jurisdictions generally do not
consider the impact of their public health and social services policies
on state and federal health care spending, nor do states account for
the impact of their decisions on the federal budget.82 Consequently,
cost-benefit considerations are unlikely to convince government
officials to devote more resources to addressing the social
impediments to good health.83
78. See id. (stating that the difficulty in calculating cross-sector savings leaves such calculations
“open to both error and political challenge”).
79. See id. at 102 (discussing how the federal budget process does not facilitate cross-sector budget
considerations).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Nicole Lurie, What the Federal Gov’t Can Do About the Nonmedical Determinates of Health, 21
HEALTH AFF. 94, 103 (2002). For example, as explained by Nicole Lurie:
[F]ederal housing, transportation, and environ-mental standards may promote
environments that are more conducive to physical activity, but ultimate decisions
about land use, such as whether housing developments are built with safe places
to walk, are left to local zoning boards. Such local bodies often lack an awareness
that their decisions could have health consequences. Similarly, . . . [i]f increased
investment in Medicaid did succeed in reducing the burden of chronic disease,
failure of states to make sufficient investment would be borne disproportionately
by the federal government, through Medicare, rather than by states themselves.
Similarly, educational attainment is a major factor in the ultimate health status of
the Medicare population, yet the federal government, not state and local
government, is the ultimate payer for health consequences of a failed educational
system.
Id.
83. See Samuel Y. Sessions, Financing State and Local Public Health Departments: A Problem of
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Political factors also lead federal and state governments to
prioritize funding for other government programs—particularly direct
medical care—over public health.84 Health improvements from
public health initiatives targeting social determinants of health are
less visible than the benefits generated by spending on medical care
or other government programs, such as scientific research and social
security.85 Relatedly, unlike government programs that benefit
identifiable individuals, the benefits of public health are diffuse and
“save[] ‘statistical lives.’”86 In addition, the benefits from reduced
rates of chronic disease accrue in the future, well beyond the next
election cycle.87 Politicians concerned with re-election thus have
little incentive to shift tax dollars to public health initiatives at the
expense of government programs addressing current, more visible
needs.88
An American ethos that highly values individualism also impedes
support for public programs addressing SDHs. As previously noted,
chronic disease often is the product of individual behaviors such as
smoking, poor diet, and insufficient physical activity.89 Although
social conditions significantly shape these behaviors,90 in a culture
such as ours that stresses autonomy and self-responsibility, poor

Chronic Illness, in FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9, at 226.
84. See id.
85. See id. (explaining that weak political support for public health in part stems from the fact that
“the benefits of public health services may be less visible than schools, roads, water systems, and police
and fire department protection (police cars and fire trucks are visible enough)”); Gostin et al., supra note
51, at 1797 (“[I]ndividuals are not often aware when they benefit from public health interventions such
as clean water or reduced air pollution or food safety.”).
86. Gostin et al., supra note 51, at 1797.
87. See id. (stating that one reason for low public and political support for public health is that,
“unlike medical interventions, which generally provide a recognizable and immediate benefit, the
benefits of public health vest in the future, long after tax dollars are spent”).
88. See id. (explaining that low support for public health reflects the fact that elected officials are
reluctant to incur the costs for public health when it will be future administrations who reap the
benefits); Lurie, supra note 82, at 103 (“[B]ecause most expected savings [from public health] occur at a
future point (often well beyond the life of a budget, an election cycle, or public expectations), it is
difficult to invest in anticipation of improving the health of our children without shortchanging a
generation of people with current needs.”).
89. See sources cited supra note 24.
90. See supra notes 39–49 and accompanying text (discussing how the conditions in which we live
and work shape individual behavior).
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lifestyle “choices” typically are attributed to the individual.91
Similarly, our cultural emphasis on autonomy and personal
responsibility lead many to ascribe personal failings to those facing
social disadvantage.92 It therefore is easy to blame individuals for
their poor health and argue against taxpayer funded programs that
target unhealthy behaviors.93 Relatedly, public health initiatives that
require behavioral changes are vulnerable to criticism that they
smack of paternalism or interfere with individual liberty.94
Interest group politics also hinder adoption of public health and
social services programs. Politicians have little incentive to champion
causes that largely benefit disadvantaged individuals who make few
campaign contributions and vote in far smaller numbers than other
voters.95 In contrast, well-organized and well-financed special
91. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY
L.J. 251, 254 (2010).
92. See id. at 257 (“Increasingly, government is unresponsive to those who are disadvantaged,
blaming individuals for their situation and ignoring the inequities woven into the systems in which we
all are mired.”).
93. See id. at 251–52. As Martha Fineman explains:
Profound inequalities are tolerated—even justified—by reference to individual
responsibility and the workings of an asserted meritocracy within a free market.
The state is not mandated to respond to those inequalities, nor does it have to
establish mechanisms to ensure more equitable distributions of either social goods
or responsibilities among individuals, groups, and institutions. Quite the opposite:
in the United States, the state is restrained from interference in the name of
individual liberty, autonomy, and paramount principles such as freedom of
contract.
Id.; see also FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9, at 226 (“[T]o the extent that chronic disease is
seen as . . . the product of individual behavior, public health can be viewed as . . . not a suitable use of
public revenues.”).
94. See Gostin et al., supra note 51, at 1798 (“Public health often requires societal or behavior
changes that are difficult to achieve, particularly when they . . . interfere with the strong cultural sense of
individual liberties.”); cf. Lindsay F. Wiley, Wendy E. Parmet & Peter D. Jacobson, Adventures in
Nannydom: Reclaiming Collective Action for the Public’s Health, 43 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 73, 73 (2015)
(discussing opposition to public health initiatives and urging public health advocates to recognize that
“the anti-paternalistic rhetoric resonates with deeply held beliefs about the relationship between the
government and its citizens in a pluralistic society”).
95. Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the American States, 40 AM.
POL. RES. 29, 30 (2012) (noting that wealthier citizens have more influence over government policy
than poorer citizens, and that “[t]he most common theoretical explanation for unequal political
representation is the fact that the more affluent tend to participate more in politics—whether it be
voting, contributing to or volunteering for a campaign . . . —compared with disadvantaged citizens”);
TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY & AM. DEMOCRACY, AM. POLITICAL SCI. ASS’N, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
IN AN AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY 14 (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/portals/54/Files/
Task%20Force%20Reports/taskforcereport.pdf (finding that lower income individuals vote less
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interest groups exert tremendous influence on policy agendas and
frequently block public health proposals adverse to their interests.96
For example, the sugar and food industries have repeatedly blocked
regulatory efforts to reduce sugar consumption.97
Finally, political considerations not only cause underfunding of
public health generally, but also skew existing public health funding
toward “short-term, dramatic priorities” over the prevention of
chronic disease. Despite the fact that chronic disease linked to SDHs
is a major cause of preventable morbidity and mortality, immediate
threats to public health such as Ebola and other pandemics garner far
greater public attention.98 This in turn motivates government officials
to mobilize public health resources for the latter over the former. As
explained by Karen Siegel and her co-authors:
So that they will be seen as addressing the immediate
concerns of their constituents, policymakers tend to focus
on what is most prominently featured in media coverage.
The media, on the other hand, exploit the “scare factor,”
frequently and make fewer financial contributions to politicians, and that this leads government officials
to disproportionately respond to the interests of wealthier constituents over the least affluent); see Emily
Badger, One Reason the Poor Have So Little Political Clout, CITYLAB (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.citylab.com/work/2014/01/one-reason-poor-have-so-little-political-clout/8068/ (discussing
low voter turnout among disadvantaged groups as one reason for why these groups have little political
clout).
96. See Gostin et al., supra note 51, at 1798 (stating that public health initiatives that mandate
changes in behavior are difficult to enact “when they impede the efforts of powerful industry groups”).
97. See, e.g., Roberto Ferdman, How the Sugar Lobby Helps Perpetuate that Sweet Tooth of Yours,
WASH. POST (June 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2014/06/25/howthe-sugar-lobby-helps-perpetuate-that-sweet-tooth-of-yours/ (discussing the political influence of the
sugar lobby). See generally GRETCHEN GOLDMAN ET AL., CTR. FOR SCI. & DEMOCRACY, ADDED
SUGAR, SUBTRACTED SCIENCE: HOW INDUSTRY OBSCURES SCIENCE AND UNDERMINES PUBLIC
HEALTH POLICY ON SUGAR (2014), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/
center-for-science-and-democracy/added-sugar-subtracted-science.pdf (discussing how the successful
tactics of the food and beverage industry have blocked public policies seeking to address Americans’
high sugar consumption).
98. See, e.g., Karen R. Siegel, K.M. Venkat Narayan & Christine Hancock, Silent Killers Amidst the
Fast and the Furious, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 7, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/05/07/
silent-killers-amidst-the-fast-and-the-furious/. A study of global public health funding found that during
the H1N1 pandemic, public attention to the disease was twenty-five times greater than that given to
diabetes, despite the latter causing far more deaths over the measured time period. See id. Governments
responded to the H1N1 threat quickly, allocating significantly more funding for H1N1 than for diabetes.
See id.
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focusing on dramatic issues such as natural disasters, bioterrorism threats, emerging virulent pandemics, and other
shock-inducing crises to increase their market share.99
Accordingly, only a small portion of public health funding targets
the social determinants of chronic disease.100
These social and political forces have not only led to chronic
underfunding for public health and social services programs, but also
make existing public and social services programs prime targets for
budget cuts. For example, although Congress established the
Prevention and Public Health Fund for prevention, wellness, and
other public health programs with passage of the ACA, Congress
subsequently diverted approximately half of this funding to other
uses.101 More generally, combined federal, state, and local public
health spending has declined from $241 per person in 2009 to $239
per person in 2013, a 10% decline after adjusting for inflation.102
Spending on social services programs has also decreased. For
example, in 2014 Congress cut funding for the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)—formerly known as food
stamps—by $8.6 billion, resulting in 850,000 households losing an
average of $90 per month in benefits.103

99. Id. For example, in response to the heightened public attention given the H1N1 pandemic,
discussed supra note 98, Congress allocated significant funding—$7.45 billion—to fighting the disease,
as compared to only $61–66 million for diabetes surveillance, education, and control over the same time
period. See id.
100. See FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9, at 46.
101. See TR. FOR AM.’S HEALTH, PREVENTION AND PUBLIC HEALTH FUND ALLOCATIONS (FY 2010
TO 2022) (2014), http://healthyamericans.org/health-issues/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/PreventionFund-Over-Time.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2016) (showing the differences between the funding levels
established under the ACA and current funding levels, including a difference of over $1 billion for fiscal
year 2015—$2 billion vs. $0.927 billion—and $1 billion for fiscal year 2016—$2 billion vs. $1 billion).
102. See Public Health Scan for Apr 16, 2015, CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH AND
POLICY, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2015/04/public-health-scan-apr-16-2015.
103. See RANDY ALISON AUSSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43332, SNAP AND RELATED
NUTRITION PROVISIONS OF THE 2014 FARM BILL (P.L. 113-70), at 2 (2014) (reporting that the
Agricultural Act of 2014 cut funding in SNAP by $8.6 billion); ED BOLEN, DOROTHY ROSENBAUM &
STACY DEAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, SUMMARY OF THE 2014 FARM BILL NUTRITION
TITLE: INCLUDES BIPARTISAN IMPROVEMENTS TO SNAP WHILE EXCLUDING HARSH HOUSE
PROVISIONS (Feb. 3, 2014) (reporting that CBO reported that the $8.6 billion reduction in SNAP
funding would shrink benefits for 850,000 households by an average of $90 a month).
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In sum, there is little hope that government officials will correct
the imbalance in spending between medical care and public health or
otherwise increase funding for public health and social services.
Therefore, those who believe the United States should do more to
ameliorate SDHs must look elsewhere for financing of such efforts.
Part III identifies one source for doing so: health care providers.
III. MOVING TOWARD GREATER INTEGRATION OF MEDICINE, PUBLIC
HEALTH, AND SOCIAL SERVICES
Prior to the 20th century, medicine and public health were largely
intertwined.104 The 20th century, however, brought various
developments that led to a separation of medicine and public health,
most importantly health providers’ embrace of the biomedical
paradigm, and the creation of separate schools for public health and
medicine.105 Medical practice thus came to focus on the downstream
treatment and curing of disease, while public health emphasized
upstream prevention through the mitigation of the social,
environmental, and behavioral causes of disease.106 A fee-for-service
104. See Gostin et al., supra note 51, at 1784 (stating that sharp boundaries between medicine and
public health did not emerge until the early to mid-20th century); Russell L. Gruen, Steven D. Pearson
& Troyen A. Brennan, Physician-Citizens—Public Roles and Professional Obligations, 291 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 94, 94 (2004) (noting that “for centuries” physicians were involved in solving health
problems in the community, but that “public roles” became “less familiar to physicians” as the
community gravitated toward the biomedical model).
105. The separation of public health and medical education led medical professionals to view public
health as an economic competitor that often infringed on the physician-patient relationship. See INST. OF
MED., PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH: EXPLORING INTEGRATION TO IMPROVE POPULATION
HEALTH 33 (2012) [hereinafter PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH]; Allan M. Brandt & Martha
Gardner, Antagonism and Accommodation: Interpreting the Relationship Between Public Health and
Medicine in the United States During the 20th Century, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 707, 709 (2010). In
addition, the separation also “isolated [medical education] from fundamental issues in prevention and
social epidemiology.” Brandt & Gardner, supra, at 710. The emergence of the biomedical model of
disease led physicians to focus on the cellular level of disease, rather than social, environmental, and
behavioral causes. Brandt & Gardner, supra, at 710. As a result, “[t]he timely and effective delivery of
new and effective treatments for specific disease became the new paradigm of clinical medicine,” with
little attention given to the social, environmental, and behavioral causes of disease. Brandt & Gardner,
supra, at 711.
106. See Brandt & Gardner, supra note 105, at 707–08 (“Although public health has come to be
identified with prevention, medicine has historically been committed to cure. Medicine is commonly
associated with the care and treatment of the individual, . . . [w]hile public health claims to ‘focus
upstream’—on ameliorating the social and environmental conditions producing disease . . . .”); Arvin
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payment methodology that rewarded providers for the quantity of
care provided, and not for keeping patients healthy, further reinforced
medicine’s neglect of SDHs.107 Thus, despite health care providers
and the public health community sharing a common goal—improving
health—they have, for the most part, operated on separate tracks.108
Fortunately, as described below, the divide between public health
and medicine is beginning to dissipate. In response to various
policies adopted under the ACA, providers are increasingly
allocating their time and resources to the social factors adversely
impacting their patients’ health. Importantly, this shift begins to
redress the imbalance between spending on traditional medicine and
spending on public health and social services.
A. Incentivizing Providers to Address the Social Determinants of
Health
The ACA set into motion various changes that encourage
providers to broaden their focus to include both the clinical and
nonclinical factors impacting health. As described below, new
payment models under Medicare and Medicaid reward providers for
improving health outcomes and lowering costs. Indeed, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has set a goal of
Garg, Brian Jack & Barry Zuckerman, Addressing the Social Determinants of Health Within the PatientCentered Medical Home, 309 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2001, at 2001 (2013) (“Mitigating the harmful
consequences of social factors that contribute to health disparities has largely been left to the public
health and policy communities, whereas clinical medicine has traditionally focused on identifying and
reducing biological risk factors for an individual patient.”).
107. Under fee-for-service, providers receive a separate payment for each unit of service they provide.
See Harold D. Miller, From Volume to Value: Better Ways to Pay for Health Care, 28 HEALTH AFF.
1418, 1419 (2009). Fee-for-service not only fails to reward providers for improving their patients’
health, but actually penalizes those who do so, as healthier patients consume fewer medical services. See
Johnson, supra note 63 (“[Under] a fee-for-service payment model that rewards the quality of services
and not results, programs that address the social determinants of health come right out of a provider’s
bottom line.”); Mary Crossley, Health and Taxes: Hospitals, Community Health and the IRS, 16 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 51, 80 (stating that because hospitals receive no compensation for keeping
their communities healthy, “[o]ne need not be a cynic to question how vigorously hospitals will pursue
efforts that—if successful—will diminish their revenue streams”). Moreover, fee-for-service only pays
for medical care, leaving providers “to use their own dollars to help patients address the social
conditions” that impact health. Johnson, supra note 63.
108. See generally Brandt & Gardner, supra note 105 (presenting a historical overview of the division
between health care and public health).
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shifting 85% of traditional Medicare payments to these new payment
models by 2016 and 90% by 2018, with HHS encouraging state
Medicaid programs and private payors to adopt similar payment
models.109 Providers increasingly are realizing that success under
these new payment models requires them to address both upstream
and downstream causes of poor health.110 In addition, the ACA gives
tax-exempt hospitals—comprising approximately 58% of all
hospitals111—greater incentives to dedicate resources to programs
aimed at social impediments to good health.
1. Payment Reforms
The ACA ushered in important changes to how Medicare and
Medicaid pay providers for patient care. One of the more promising
payment reforms is the accountable care organization (ACO) model.
ACOs are local organizations comprised of primary care physicians
and other providers that agree to be jointly accountable for the cost
and quality of care delivered to a patient population.112 Under the
voluntary Medicare Shared Savings Program, providers participating
in ACOs that successfully lower the aggregate annual cost of caring
for their Medicare patients receive a percentage of the savings,
provided the ACO also satisfies certain quality metrics.113 CMS has
109. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Better, Smarter, Healthier: In Historic
Announcement, HHS Sets Clear Goals and Timeline for Shifting Medicare Reimbursements from
Volume to Value (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2015pres/01/20150126a.html.
110. See generally ASS’N FOR CMTY. HEALTH IMPROVEMENT, TRENDS IN HOSPITAL-BASED
POPULATION HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE: RESULTS FROM AN ASSOCIATION FOR COMMUNITY HEALTH
IMPROVEMENT AND AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION SURVEY 4 (2013) [hereinafter TRENDS IN
HOSPITAL-BASED POPULATION HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE] (“Adopting a population-based approach to
care that encompasses the spectrum of determinants of health is essential for care systems to thrive in
the ACA era.”).
111. See Hospitals by Ownership Type, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other/stateindicator/hospitals-by-ownership. Just over 20 percent of hospitals are owned by state and local
governments, with the remaining operating as for-profit hospitals. See id.
112. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3022, 124 Stat. 119,
395–99 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2012)).
113. See Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,927 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425). Under the shared savings
payment model, the ACO continues to receive fee-for-service based payments, but Medicare also
rewards an ACO that meets or exceeds its targeted cost savings with a bonus equal to a percentage of
the savings. See id. The Medicare Shared Savings Program also includes economic incentives for ACOs
to improve quality by tying a portion of an ACO’s reimbursement to its performance on quality
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stated that in the future it may pay ACOs on a capitated basis, with
participating organizations receiving a single payment for each
Medicare patient under their care.114 A number of state Medicaid
programs, as well as private payors, similarly are adopting the ACO
model.115 Collectively these payment reforms have encouraged the
formation of over 600 ACOs, with more than half of Americans
living in an area served by an ACO.116
ACOs have responded to these financial incentives by
restructuring their practices so as to advance their patients’ health at
lower costs. To date, these efforts largely have focused on improving
the medical treatment of patients within the walls of the clinical
setting, primarily improving coordination of patient care across
benchmarks. See id. For example, an ACO that performs poorly on the relevant quality measures may be
ineligible for any bonus payment under the shared savings or shared savings and risk payment models,
even if the ACO lowers the cost of care. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.100(b) (2012) (stating that ACOs
participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program are eligible for shared savings only if they meet
the minimum quality performance standards, among other requirements).
After completing their initial term in the program, providers participating in an ACO will continue to
receive a percentage of any Medicare savings, but also will be penalized with a downward adjustment in
their Medicare reimbursement rates if the ACO does not meet targeted cost savings. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 425.600(b) (2012) (providing that for subsequent agreement periods, an ACO may not operate under
the one-sided model described at 42 C.F.R. § 425.604, leaving available only the two-sided model
described at 42 C.F.R. § 425.606). ACOs also may elect to enroll in the shared savings and risk model
during their initial term. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.600(a) (providing that during its initial agreement period,
an ACO may elect to operate under either the one-sided model or two-sided model).
114. See Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76
Fed. Reg. at 67,805 (discussing the possibility of CMS in the future paying ACOs based on a capitation
payment model). In addition to the Medicare Shared Savings Program, CMS has established the Pioneer
ACO Model (Pioneer Program) for organizations with experience operating as ACOs. See Pioneer ACO
Model Fact Sheet, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, https://innovation.cms.gov/
initiatives/Pioneer-ACO-Model/PioneerACO-FactSheet.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2016). Under this
program, participating ACOs will receive higher levels of reward and assume greater financial risk than
ACOs participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program. See id. In addition, in year three of the
Pioneer Program, CMS will begin testing a capitated payment model, with eligible ACOs receiving a
monthly per-beneficiary amount in lieu of part or all of the ACO’s fee-for-service payments. See id.
115. See David Muhlestein, Growth and Dispersion of Accountable Care Organizations in 2015,
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (March 31, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/03/31/growth-anddispersion-of-accountable-care-organizations-in-2015-2/ (reporting that Medicaid ACOs have grown
significantly since 2014, and that the growth in people included in accountable care arrangements since
2014 is primarily from the commercial and Medicaid sectors); CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES,
INC., MEDICAID ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: STATE UPDATE 1 (2015),
http://www.chcs.org/media/ACO-Fact-Sheet-32515-ak.pdf (“Many states have begun to implement
Medicaid accountable care organizations (ACOs) . . . .”).
116. See Richard Ingram, F. Douglas Scutchfield & Julia F. Costich, Public Health Departments and
Accountable Care Organizations: Finding Common Ground in Population Health, 105 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 840, 840 (2015).
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providers, ensuring that patients receive clinically-based preventive
care, and avoiding medical care of limited value.117 But, linking
ACOs’ payments to the overall health of their patient populations
also encourages ACOs to address SDHs.118 Under the ACO model,
ACOs that improve patient health by investing in social services and
other nonclinical interventions can accrue greater financial
rewards.119 For example, a Medicaid ACO can improve health
outcomes and lower the medical costs of treating its homeless
patients by helping them obtain stable housing.120
Other payment reforms incentivizing providers to address SDHs
include value-based purchasing, bundled payments, and hospital
readmissions penalties. The Medicare Hospital Value-Based
Purchasing Program and Physician Value-Based Payment (VBP)
Modifier link hospitals’ and physicians’ Medicare reimbursement
rates to their performance on various cost and quality measures.121
117. See CRAWFORD ET AL., supra note 29, at 3–4 (discussing the types of health services that
improve population health, such as immunizations, screening for disease, and counseling for tobacco
use, obesity, and other risky behaviors); Jacobi, supra note 36, at 97 (explaining how ACOs reduce
fragmentation among providers); Lauris Christopher Kaldjian, Patient Care and Population Health:
Goals, Roles and Costs, 3 J. PUB. HEALTH RES. 81, 81 (2014) (“Much of the current emphasis on cost
control is appropriately directed at avoiding tests and treatments that do not improve health.”).
118. See Corbett & Kappagoda, supra note 58, at 18 (“Because [the ACO] model incentivizes health
systems to maintain the health of large patient populations rather than provide expensive treatments to
individuals, institutions have a reason to look at all the factors that might negatively affect patients’
health status, including the social determinants of health.”); Jacobi, supra note 36, at 90 (“This
population orientation incents the organizations creating Medicaid ACOs to adopt a broader perspective
toward health care, directly addressing some of the social factors beyond medical treatment that directly
affect population health status.”).
119. See Jacobi, supra note 36, at 108 (explaining that ACOs that reinvest their financial rewards in
nonclinical measures that ameliorate the social impediments to health can create a “virtuous cycle”).
120. See id. at 107–08 (“[Medicaid] ACOs serving a sizeable homeless population may be able to use
a portion of their shared savings to work with local housing agencies to help get patients into stable
housing and thereby reduce related, unnecessary medical spending . . . .” (quoting DeCubellis & Evans,
supra note 70)). For example, Hennepin Health, a Medicaid ACO in Hennepin, MN, leases public
housing units for some of its homeless patients. See CRAWFORD ET AL., supra note 29, at 10.
121. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3001(a), 124 Stat. 119,
363–64 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww(o), 1395w–4(p) (2012)). The Hospital
Value-Based Purchasing Program began in October 2012. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(1)(B). Hospitals
performing poorly had their payment rates for inpatient acute care services reduced by up to 1.0%, with
the percentage reduction gradually increasing to 2.0% for fiscal year 2017. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww(o)(7)(C). The Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier (PVPM) began in January 2015. 42
C.F.R. § 414.1210 (2017). Initially the program applies only to physicians in groups of 100 or more
physicians and other “eligible professionals,” but will apply to all physicians in 2017. See Medicare
Program: Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule, 77 Fed. Reg. 68,892,
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Similar to the ACO payment models, improving patients’ health and
lowering costs by addressing SDHs will translate into higher
Medicare payment rates by raising a provider’s performance
scores.122 Under the Medicare Bundled Payments for Care
Improvement Initiative, participating providers receive a single
payment for an episode of care that is then allocated among all
providers treating a patient.123 For providers participating in the
bundled payments program, ameliorating SDHs can lower costs and
help providers avoid exhausting the fixed bundled payment
amounts.124 Finally, the Medicare Readmission Reductions Program,
which reduces payments to hospitals with high readmission rates,125
promotes hospitals’ addressing nonclinical factors that contribute to
patients’ readmission to the hospital, such as environmental hazards
in a patient’s home or barriers to receiving adequate follow-up care
in the outpatient setting.126 Many state Medicaid programs have
adopted similar payment reforms.127
69,306 (Nov. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 410, 414, 415). The Medicare statute includes in
its definition of “eligible professional” physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, clinical
nurse specialists, certified registered nurse anesthetists, certified nurse midwives, clinical social
workers, clinical psychologists, registered dieticians, nutrition professionals, audiologists, and physical,
occupational, and qualified speech-language therapists. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w–4(k)(3)(B). Beginning in
2019, the PVPM program will be replaced by the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS),
which was authorized by section 101 of the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015
(MACRA). H.R. 2, Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129 Stat. 87 (2015). Similar to the PVPM program, under MIPS
physicians who score highly on selected measures will receive payment bonuses. See id. Performance
and composite scores under MIPS will be based on four categories: quality, resource use, meaningful
use of electronic health records, and clinical practice improvement activities. See id.
122. See generally Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA), H.R. 2, Pub.
L. No. 114-10, 129 Stat. 87.
123. See Press Release, Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Bundled Payments for Care
Improvement Initiative (Aug. 23, 2011), https://cms.gov/newsroom/mediareleasedatabase/factsheets/2011-fact-sheets-items/2011-08-23.html. The initiative tests four different bundled payment
models, with the models varying by the types of health care providers involved and the services
included in the bundle. See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Announces New
Initiative to Improve Care and Reduce Costs for Medicare (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/
Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-Releases/2013-Press-Releases-Items/2013-01-31.html.
124. Cf. Asch & Volpp, supra note 36, at 889 (stating that bundled payments reflect a population
approach to health focused on outcomes); Ingram, Scutchfield & Costich, supra note 116, at 842 (noting
that an individual interviewed by the authors suggested that, under a bundled payments model,
investments in public health agency activities could result in significant savings); Johnson, supra note
63 (describing how Sinai Health System hopes to generate savings under the Medicare bundled
payments initiative that can be used to finance its efforts to address the social determinants of health).
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q) (2012).
126. See Crossley, supra note 107, at 83–84 (noting that the ACA’s hospital readmission penalties are
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2. Obligations of Tax-Exempt Hospitals
Both the decline in the number of uninsured individuals and
changes in the tax laws reinforce the financial incentives described
above, at least for tax-exempt hospitals. Section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code exempts from federal income taxes entities
organized and operated for charitable purposes.128 Early IRS
guidance stated that a hospital serves a charitable purpose only if it
provides free care to those unable to pay for its services.129 For
decades the IRS issued little guidance on what constituted
community benefits.130 In 1965, however, the IRS established the
broader community benefit standard, which requires that a hospital’s
activities benefit the community generally.131
Calls for greater accountability and transparency of hospitals’
charitable activities led the IRS in 2007 to introduced Schedule H, a
mandatory reporting schedule of hospitals’ expenditures for
charitable activities.132 Schedule H is incorporated into the Form 990
information return that all tax-exempt entities must file annually.133
Schedule H lists hospital activities that are considered community
among the payment reforms pushing hospitals to give greater attention to population health
improvement). For example, hospitals seeking to reduce readmissions among asthma patients can
address environmental factors in a patient’s home, such as mold and dust, that may aggravate asthma.
See id.
127. See VERNON K. SMITH ET AL., MEDICAID REFORMS TO EXPAND COVERAGE, CONTROL COSTS
AND IMPROVE CARE 35–38 (2015) (reporting that 37 states in either fiscal year 2015 or fiscal year 2016
are adopting or expanding their initiatives to reward quality and encourage integrated care, including
patient-centered medical homes, health homes, and ACOs, with some states also implementing episode
of care initiatives or value-based purchasing initiatives).
128. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2015). Entities organized and operated for religious, scientific, or educational
purposes also are exempt. See id.
129. See Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
130. See Crossely, supra note 107, at 61–62 (summarizing the history of the IRS’s community benefit
standard). Critics also contend that the community benefit standard has gone largely unenforced by the
IRS, with few hospitals losing their tax-exempt status. See, e.g., Jessica Wilen Berg, Putting the
Community Back into the ‘Community Benefit’ Standard, 44 GA. L. REV. 375, 382 (2010) (“[T]he IRS
historically took little action against hospitals failing to meet the [community benefit] criteria in their
continued operations, except in cases of egregious violations.”); Crossley, supra note 107, at 62
(“Practically speaking, once a hospital achieved tax exempt status, the IRS typically did not closely
scrutinize its ongoing operations to assess, much less quantify, what benefits its community actually
received.”).
131. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
132. See Crossley, supra note 107, at 62–63
133. See id.
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benefit activities.134 The categories include not only charity care,
defined as unreimbursed costs for treating indigent or uninsured
patients and enrollees in means-tested government programs, but also
“community health improvement.”135 The IRS defines “community
health improvement services” as “activities or programs . . . for the
express purpose of improving community health.”136
Despite this clarification of the community benefit standard, taxexempt hospitals do little community health improvement, focusing
instead on the provision of charity care.137 According to a 2015 IRS
report, more than half of hospitals’ community benefit expenditures
were for the provision of charity care, with less than 8% of
expenditures directed to community health improvement.138
The ACA, however, adopts various reforms that incentivize
hospitals’ to devote a greater share of their resources to community
health improvement, including SDHs. First, the law’s health
insurance reforms, premium subsidies for low and moderate income
individuals, and expansion of Medicaid have reduced the number of
uninsured individuals needing charity care.139 Recent data shows that
20 million people have gained insurance under the ACA,140 with a
corresponding $7.4 billion decline in the amount of uncompensated
care provided by hospitals from 2013–2014, a 21% decrease.141 With
lower demands for charity care, , to maintain their tax-exempt status,
134. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OMB NO. 1545-0047, SCHEDULE H (FORM 990) HOSPITALS (2015).
135. Id. Schedule H also lists “health professions education, subsidized health services, and research”
as community benefit activities. Id.
136. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE H (FORM 990) 16–17 (2015).
137. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., The Value of the Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption Was $24.6
Billion in 2011, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1225, 1226 (2015).
138. See id. (discussing IRS report to Congress on tax-exempt hospitals; report is not publicly
available). An additional 36% of total net community benefit spending was spent on health professions
education, research, and certain subsidized health services. See id.
139. See Press Release, 20 Million People Have Gained New Coverage because of theAffordable
Care Act, New Estimates Show, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (March 3, 2016),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2016/03/03/20-million-people-have-gained-health-insurance-coveragebecause-affordable-care-act-new-estimates [http://wayback.archive-it.org/3926/20170128080500/
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2016/03/03/20-million-people-have-gained-health-insurance-coveragebecause-affordable-care-act-new-estimates].
140. See id.
141. See DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING &
EVALUATION, INSURANCE EXPANSION, HOSPITAL UNCOMPENSATED CARE, AND THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT (2015), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/139226/ib_UncompensatedCare.pdf.
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some hospitals will need to increase their other community benefit
activities, such as community health improvement.142
Second, to address concerns that hospitals were not providing
sufficient community benefits to justify their tax exemption,143
Congress imposed on tax-exempt hospitals new requirements that
encourage greater responsiveness to communities’ health needs.144
Section 501(r)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, added by the ACA,
requires each tax-exempt hospital to conduct a community health
needs assessment (CHNA) once every three years.145 A hospital’s
CHNA must identify its community’s “significant health needs.”146
IRS regulations clarify that a hospital’s assessment of its
community’s health needs should consider nonclinical factors that
impact health.147 These factors include: “financial and other barriers”
to accessing care; whether community members receive adequate
nutrition; and social, behavioral, and environmental factors that
influence the community’s health.148 When conducting its CHNA, a
hospital must solicit input from individuals representing community
interests, “including those with special knowledge of or expertise in
public health.”149 After identifying its community’s health needs, the
hospital must adopt an implementation strategy that prioritizes those
needs and identifies available resources for addressing them.150 A
hospital must also describe any plans to collaborate with other

142. See Crossley, supra note 107, at 76 (“The decline in the number of uninsured
Americans . . . could call into question hospitals’ reliance primarily on charity care to satisfy the
community benefit standard.”); Gostin et al., supra note 51, at 1790 (stating that if many formerly
uninsured members of a hospital’s community gain health insurance, “[s]ome facilities may then fail to
supply the volume of uncompensated care needed to meet the community-benefit test”).
143. See Crossley, supra note 107, at 65 (explaining that section 501(r)’s CHNA requirement was
enacted in response to Senator Grassley’s concerns about “hospital’s lack of accountability for
community benefits,” and that the requirement was established “as part of the quid pro quo for relieving
hospitals from their federal tax liability.”).
144. See I.R.C. § 501(r)(3) (2012).
145. Id.
146. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-3(b)(4) (2015).
147. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-3(b)(4).
148. Id.
149. I.R.C. § 501(r)(3)(B)(i) (2012). Section 501(r) of the Internal Revenue Code also imposes new
standards related to financial assistance for patients, charges for services, and debt collection. See id.
150. I.R.C. § 501(r)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-3(b)(4).
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organizations—such as other hospitals, public health departments,
and schools—in addressing community health needs.151
Although the new CHNA requirement does not mandate that taxexempt hospitals devote resources to SDHs, it encourages hospitals
to move beyond their patients’ individual clinical needs and take a
more proactive approach to population health.152 As explained by
Mary Crossley:
The CHNA requirement . . . has the potential to prompt a
more radical change in hospitals’ relationship to their
communities. . . . It directs a hospital to shift its gaze
outward, to engage with its surrounding community, and to
consider how the hospital might play a role in meeting the
health needs of that community—that group of people—
and not simply the medical needs of individual community
residents.153
In doing so, the CHNA requirement reinforces the financial
incentives created by the payment reforms discussed above.154
B. Examples of Providers Working to Address the Social
Determinants of Health
Although no one formally tracks the number of providers
addressing SDHs, many commentators believe providers increasingly
are doing so in response to the reforms described above.155 These
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-3(c).
152. See Crossley, supra note 107, at 57.
153. Id.; see also PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 105, at 112 (stating that the
CHNA requirement gives hospitals a reason to invest in community prevention).
154. Crossley, supra note 107, at 57.
155. See DeCubellis & Evans, supra note 70 (“Across the country, a growing number of innovators in
the health care sector are designing care coordination programs to better serve low-income, high-need
populations and begin to address the relevant social issues.”); see CRAWFORD ET AL., supra note 29, at
2–4 (“There are a growing number of examples of population health services that extend literally and/or
figuratively beyond the traditional walls of the a clinical setting, . . . [including initiatives] promoting
community or public health services.”); Johnson, supra note 63 (“[A] growing number of health systems
across the country . . . have begun tackling the social, economic and environmental conditions in the
communities they serve as part of their programs to reduce hospital readmissions and improve
outcomes.”); Christopher J. Gearon, Treating Hunger As a Health Issue, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
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programs target both individuals’ social needs and community-level
causes of poor health.156 While a comprehensive cataloging of these
activities is beyond the scope of this article, this section describes
some of the more common initiatives.
Some providers are linking their patients to community groups that
help individuals address their resource and legal needs.157 For
example, providers coordinating with Health Leads write their
patients prescriptions for basic needs such as food or heat, with
Health Leads volunteers then “filling” the prescriptions by
connecting patients to available community services.158 Other
providers help their patients enroll in public assistance programs,
such as SNAP or the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)
program.159
Recent years also have seen tremendous growth in providersponsored medical-legal partnerships.160 Medical-legal partnerships
assist patients with legal problems that affect stress levels or
otherwise contribute to poor health.161 For example, medical-legal
partnerships assist patients with housing issues, such as preventing
(Feb. 13, 2014), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/hospital-of-tomorrow/articles/2014/02/13/
treating-hunger-as-a-health-issue (stating in response to “payment carrots and sticks” under the ACA
that reward “keeping people well and preventing disease,” some hospitals are going beyond caredelivery transformations and “teaming up with local stakeholders . . . in hopes of moving the needle on
social determinants of health in communities”).
156. See Decubellis & Evans, supra note 70.
157. See HEALTH LEADS, https://healthleadsusa.org/what-we-do/our-model/ (last visited Jan. 14,
2016).
158. See id.
159. See Gearon, supra note 155; STUART BUTLER, JONATHAN GRABINSKY & DOMITILLA MASI,
BROOKINGS INST., HOSPITALS AS HUBS TO CREATE HEALTH COMMUNITIES: LESSONS FROM
WASHINGTON ADVENTIST HOSPITAL 7 (2015) (describing a hospital’s program to help patients enroll in
social services and benefits for which they are eligible).
160. See Tina Rosenberg, When Poverty Makes You Sick, a Lawyer Can Be the Cure, N.Y. TIMES
(July 17, 2014, 9:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/when-poverty-makes-yousick-a-lawyer-can-be-the-cure/?_r=0. Whereas there were few medical-legal partnerships five to ten
years ago, today over 276 health care institutions have medical-legal partnerships. See id. (“There were
few medical-legal partnerships until about five or 10 years ago . . . .”); Partnerships Across the U.S.,
NAT’L CTR. FOR MED. LEGAL PARTNERSHIP, http://medical-legalpartnership.org/partnerships/ (last
visited Jan. 14, 2016) (presenting statistics on the current number of medical-legal partnerships).
161. See The MLP Response, NAT’L CTR. FOR MED. LEGAL PARTNERSHIP, http://medicallegalpartnership.org/mlp-response/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2016) (“Medical-legal partnership (MLP)
embeds lawyers and paralegals alongside health care teams to detect, address and prevent healthharming social conditions for people and communities.”).
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evictions or suing landlords for noncompliance with local housing
standards.162 They also help patients obtain public benefits to which
they are legally entitled, like Medicaid.163 The growth in medical
legal partnerships reflects providers’ recognition that such programs
“are becoming a better investment” given the new payment models
that reward providers for lowering costs.164
Some providers are tackling social impediments to good health
directly.165 For example, several hospitals and health systems have
launched various initiatives designed to address patients’ food
insecurity issues—providing meals to at-risk individuals, offering
healthy meals cooking courses, and pushing for produce-filled
grocery stores in urban food deserts.166 Many providers arrange
transportation for those needing transport to and from their medical
appointments.167 And, some providers have implemented programs
that target risky behaviors among high-need patients, such as
smoking cessation programs, gun violence prevention projects,
parenting courses, diabetes prevention, and meditation.168

162. See Jeffrey Martin et al., Embedding Civil Legal Aid Services In Care For High-Utilizing
Patients Using Medical-Legal Partnership, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 22, 2015),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/04/22/embedding-civil-legal-aid-services-in-care-for-high-utilizingpatients-using-medical-legal-partnership/ (describing the most common concerns addressed by
Lancaster Health’s medical-legal partnership).
163. See id.
164. Rosenberg, supra note 160.
165. See Gearon, supra note 155.
166. See id.
167. See, e.g., BUTLER, GRABINSKY & MASI, supra note 159, at 6, 9–10 (describing the efforts of
Washington Adventist Hospital to coordinate transportation to and from appointments); Imran Cronk,
The Transportation Barrier, ATLANTIC (Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/
2015/08/the-transportation-barrier/399728/ (noting that some health care providers employ community
health workers to coordinate transportation for patients to and from appointments); Special Needs
Resource Directory: Medical Transportation, CINCINNATI CHILD., http://www.cincinnatichildrens.org/
patients/child/special-needs/medical/transportation/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2016).
168. See Douglas J. Noble & Lawrence P. Casalino, Can Accountable Care Organizations Improve
Population Health? Should They Try?, 309 JAMA 1119, 1119–20 (2013) (describing a hospital’s gun
violence prevention project); CLIFFORD W. BEERS GUIDANCE CLINIC, INC. Summary of The New Haven
Wrap Around, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, https://innovation.cms.gov/
initiatives/Participant/Health-Care-Innovation-Awards-Round-Two/Clifford-W-Beers-Guidance-ClinicInc.html (last updated Sept. 9, 2016) (describing the integrated medical, behavioral health, and
community-based services model of grantee Clifford W. Beers Guidance Clinic).
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The future promises to bring additional anecdotes of providers
moving beyond the biomedical model and targeting the SDHs that
adversely impact patients’ health.169
In sum, the health care system is moving toward a blending of
traditional medicine, public health, and social services, with greater
attention and resources devoted to addressing SDHs. As described in
Part IV, this shift has the potential to both improve the population’s
health and lower health care spending. Unfortunately, various factors
may limit the range of SDH initiatives providers choose to undertake.
IV. THE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF PROVIDERS ADDRESSING THE
SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH
With the biomedical paradigm deeply embedded within the
existing health care system, shifting to a culture that also addresses
nonclinical factors impacting health will happen only if providers
have strong incentives to address SDHs.170 The reforms discussed in
Part III.A begin to do just that. This development provides a potential
solution to America’s chronic underfunding of public health and
social services programs. Moreover, providers have certain inherent
advantages over public health and social services agencies. In
addition, as providers become more invested in improving the
community’s health, providers will use their political clout to push
for greater public funding of government interventions that address
SDHs. Nevertheless, the potential for health care reforms to broaden
providers’ orientation beyond the clinical setting should not be
overstated, as providers lack the incentives and capacity to address
many of the root causes of poor health. As a result, providers’ efforts
to address SDHs may prove an incomplete solution to American’s
underfunding of public health and social services programs.

169. See Asch & Volpp, supra note 36, at 889 (“In the future, successful doctors, hospitals and health
systems will shift their activities from delivering health services within their walls toward a broader
range of approaches that deliver health.”).
170. See supra Part III.A.
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A. The Benefits of Providers Addressing the Social Determinants of
Health
Incentivizing providers to allocate more time and resources to
addressing SDHs provides a potential solution the problem discussed
in Part II—chronic underfunding of public health and social services
programs. Providers’ expanding focus on SDHs has other benefits as
well. Relative to government agencies, providers’ are better
positioned to provide coordinated clinical and nonclinical
interventions tailored to both individual and community specific
needs. Moreover, as providers’ financial interests increasingly align
with broader public health goals, they will use their political clout to
potentially accomplish what others have been unable to do—
convincing elected officials to increase funding for public health and
social services programs.
1. Providers’ Advantages
Relative to government actors, providers are better positioned to
provide coordinated, multi-prong nonclinical interventions tailored to
individuals’ unique circumstances and values. Government funding
of public health and social services is inflexible and
compartmentalized, characterized by categorical funding earmarked
for specific concerns and individuals, such as transportation services
for the disabled and elderly, and subsidized housing for families.171
Government agencies thus lack the flexibility to address issues or
individuals falling outside the funded categories.172 For example,
although permanent supportive housing can significantly improve the
health of the chronically homeless,173 Medicaid only pays for
171. See FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9, at 52–53 (discussing categorical funding for
public health).
172. See id. at 54–55 (arguing that categorical funding limits what public health agencies can do,
leaving them unable “to meet local needs”); cf. Ani B. Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation in Disability
and Health Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 277, 279–90 (2010) (arguing that legal structures fragment protections
and benefits for the disabled, leaving some individuals with impairments excluded and others with
important needs unaddressed).
173. See Doran, Misa & Shah, supra note 68, at 2374 (“Placing people who are homeless in
supportive housing—affordable housing paired with supportive services such as on-site case
management and referrals to community-based services—can lead to improved health, reduced hospital
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enrollees’ medical care and not their housing;174 meanwhile, many
state and local housing agencies exclude the homeless population
from their programs.175 Compartmentalized funding also often leaves
public health departments and other government agencies with
inadequate funding for basic capabilities, such as information
systems and personnel for collecting and analyzing data.176 Finally,
with funding spread across different sectors of government, programs
addressing SDHs often operate in uncoordinated silos, with “parallel
activities and services that overlap, are duplicative and are
inefficient.”177
In contrast to government agencies, providers have the capacity
and flexibility to undertake activities tailored to individual patient’s
social needs. Providers’ in-person, one-on-one interactions with their
patients make them “ideally placed, and perhaps uniquely so, to
observe the health effects of socioeconomic factors or detect when
such factors compromise their patients’ care.”178 Providers’ ongoing
relationships with patients further facilitate providers’ gaining a fuller
understanding of the factors affecting a patient’s health, allowing
providers to take a holistic view of a patient’s health-related needs.179
In addition, with no restrictions on how they allocate their resources,
use, and decreased health care costs, especially when frequent users of health services are targeted.”);
Kathy Moses & Rachel Davis, Housing is a Prescription for Better Health, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July
22, 2015), http://www.healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/07/22/housing-is-a-prescription-for-better-health/
(“More and more evidence shows that housing homeless individuals leads to reductions in health care
utilization and costs.”).
174. See CAROL WILKINS, MARTHA BURT & GRETCHEN LOCKE, A PRIMER ON USING MEDICAID FOR
PEOPLE EXPERIENCING CHRONIC HOMELESSNESS AND TENANTS IN PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE HOUSING
5 (July 23, 2014), https://www.aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/77121/PSHprimer.pdf (explaining
that although state Medicaid programs can cover certain components of permanent supportive housing
programs, they cannot pay for the housing itself).
175. See John J. Ammann, Housing Out the Poor, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 309, 309 (2000)
(explaining that federal housing policies have made it harder for the homeless to be admitted to the
limited supply of public housing and other assisted housing programs).
176. See FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9, at 51 (“Compartmentalized inflexible
funding . . . leaves many health departments without financing for . . . needed cross-cutting capabilities
(such as information systems and policy analysis).”).
177. FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, supra note 9, at 54.
178. Gruen, Pearson & Brennan, supra note 104, at 95.
179. Cf. PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 105, at 21 (“Primary care adopts
mechanisms that facilitate the transfer of information about health needs and health care over time.
Highly personalized solutions to patients’ problems can be implemented when sustained relationships
permit deeper knowledge and understanding of individuals’ habits, preferences, and goals.”).
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providers have the flexibility to develop coordinated, multi-pronged,
“[h]ighly personalized solutions to patients’ problems.”180 Providers’
budgeting flexibility also allows for investment in the basic
capabilities needed to support such an approach.181 Finally,
unconstrained by eligibility requirements that limit who they can
help, providers can assist any patients who would benefit from
interventions addressing their upstream health needs.
The patient-centered medical home epitomizes this more holistic,
individualized approach to patients’ social needs. This approach
relies on interdisciplinary teams guided by “the principle that
individual patients are members of a broader community.”182 Team
members work together to develop a comprehensive plan for
improving a patient’s health, including steps for addressing
nonclinical needs.183 Policymakers have exhibited increased interest
in the patient-centered medical home model,184 with several state
Medicaid programs actively promoting this model of care.185
Similar to the patient-centered medical home model, programs
targeting “super-utilizers”—patients with extraordinarily high health
care costs—also provide comprehensive, tailored interventions that
address both clinical and nonclinical needs.186 These individuals
180. Id.; see also Jacobi, supra note 36, at 107–08 (noting that total accountable care organizations
(TACOs) have the flexibility to use their resources to be responsive to the particular conditions affecting
the population they serve).
181. See Jacobi, supra note 36, at 108.
182. PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 105, at 22–23.
183. See Jacobi, supra note 36, at 377 (explaining that the cross-functional care teams that span the
continuum of physical health, behavioral health, and social services can tailor approaches to each
patient).
184. See PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 105, at 22 (“In the last few years, intensive
activity has focused on implementing the ‘patient-centered medical home,’ spurred by funding and
research supported by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the Commonwealth Fund,
HRSA [Health Resources and Services Administration], and a number of other groups.”).
185. See JANET M. CORRIGAN & ELLIOTT S. FISHER, THE DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY &
CLINICAL PRACTICE, ACCOUNTABLE HEALTH COMMUNITIES: INSIGHTS FROM STATE HEALTH REFORM
INITIATIVES 1211 (2014), http://tdi.dartmouth.edu/images/uploads/AccountHealthCommWhPaperFinal.pdf (describing state patient-centered medical home initiatives); MARY TAKACH & JASON
BUXBAUM, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, CARE MANAGEMENT FOR MEDICAID ENROLLEES THROUGH
COMMUNITY HEALTH TEAMS 9 (2013), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/
fund-report/2013/may/1690_takach_care_mgmt_medicaid_enrollees_community_hlt_teams_520.pdf
(same).
186. See Sandra G. Boodman, Hospitals and Insurers Struggle to Reduce Costs by Patients Dubbed
“Super-Utilizers,” WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
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typically suffer from multiple chronic conditions and make frequent
use of emergency room care.187 Super-utilizer programs generally
rely on case managers to manage super-utilizers’ complex needs.188
These case managers not only arrange for and coordinate these
patients’ clinical care, but also focus on the SDHs that can trigger
these patients’ frequent emergency room visits and need for other
clinical care.189
To illustrate this more holistic approach to patient care, consider
the case of Delores Banks, a 61-year-old diabetic with congestive
heart failure living in senior public housing.190 Ms. Banks was unable
to shop for food or attend scheduled doctor visits when the elevator
in her building stopped working.191 Sinai Health System intervened,
contacting the Chicago Housing Authority to expedite repair work.192
Sinai also attended to her other nonclinical needs, helping Ms. Banks
with prescription drug costs, ensuring that she had transportation to
and from her doctor, and assisting her in completing paperwork that
allowed her to move to a better senior-living facility.193
The same flexibility that allows providers to shape interventions to
individual patients’ unique needs also supports providers creating
locally tailored innovations at the community level.194 Unlike local
governments that cannot shift funds between different categories of
activities, providers can allocate resources based on their

science/hospitals-and-insurers-struggle-to-reduce-costs-by-patients-dubbed-super-utilizers/2013/10/
07/2963b048-14ae-11e3-a100-66fa8fd9a50c_story.html.
187. See id.
188. See WILKINS, BURT & LOCKE, supra note 174, at 89 (describing the different types of superutilizer programs). Like the medical home model, some super-utilizer programs also employ
interdisciplinary teams. See id.
189. See Boodman, supra note 186 (“In addition to a patient’s medical and mental health needs,
[super-utilizer programs] focus on the social determinants of health including income, education and
community support, low levels of which often trigger unnecessary readmissions.”).
190. See Johnson, supra note 63.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Cf. TRICIA MCGINNIS & DAVID MARC SMALL, CTR. HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, ACCOUNTABLE
CARE ORGANIZATIONS IN MEDICAID: EMERGING PRACTICES TO GUIDE PROGRAM DESIGN 5 (2012),
http://www.chcs.org/media/Creating_ACOs_in_Medicaid.pdf (“Provider-led ACOs are well positioned
to create locally tailored innovations and partnerships essential for success.”).
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communities’ specific needs and priorities.195 This flexibility also
allows providers to serve as social laboratories, testing different
approaches to improving community health and seeing which
interventions work best.196 Providers’ ability to experiment with
different approaches to SDHs is an especially important function due
to evidentiary gaps regarding which interventions are most effective
and efficient.197 Moreover, with regular patient interactions and
access to vast patient data, providers are strategically placed to
identify community health trends.198
Ongoing initiatives undertaken by Boston Children’s Hospital and
Cincinnati Children’s Hospital exemplify how providers can address
community health needs in innovative ways. After its community
needs assessment identified asthma as a top pediatric health issue,
Boston Children’s Hospital used admissions and other health data to
identify five low-income neighborhoods in Boston that accounted for
70% of asthma-related admissions.199 The hospital then provided
tailored case management to high-risk asthma patients and their
195. See id. at 4.
196. See id. at 1.
197. See Garg, Jack & Zuckerman, supra note 106, at 2002. As explained by one group of
commentators:
The current climate offers health care systems an opportunity to design,
implement, and study the effects of [nonclinical] programs. If these programs
could be shown to improve population health and help to control costs in ways
such as reducing hospital admission and readmission, among other important
outcome measures, then broad dissemination can occur.
Id.; see also infra note 228 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need for more research on
how best to address social factors impacting health.
198. Providers’ ability to detect community health trends is aided by the greater availability of health
data and advances in electronic health records and health informatics that support population-level data
analysis. See Karen Hacker & Deborah Klein Walker, Achieving Population Health in Accountable
Care Organizations, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1163, 1164 (2013) (stating the emergence of electronic
medical records will help providers such as ACOs “become more facile at viewing their population as a
whole and identifying trends across their panel’s health”); PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra
note 105, at 18–19 (explaining that increased availability of health-related data through greater use of
electronic heath records, data sharing among providers, and more publicly available health data sets,
give providers and others “an unprecedented opportunity to access and analyze information that can aid
in understanding and addressing community-level health concerns”). This in turn allows providers to
“more carefully direct their health care assets” in a manner that maximizes the impact of their
interventions on community health. ALPER & BACIU, supra note 72, at 19.
199. See JULIANNE R. HOWELL ET AL., NEMOURS, TRANSFORMING POPULATION HEALTH: CASE
STUDIES OF PLACE-BASED APPROACHES 3 (2012), http://nemours.org/content/dam/nemours/www/
filebox/healthpro/advocacy/boston.pdf.
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families in these neighborhoods.200 But the hospital did not stop
there. It also addressed the issue at the community level, promoting
asthma education through workshops and social marketing and
helping to organize asthma-related community activities, such as the
Boston Asthma Games.201 Cincinnati Children’s similarly identified
specific communities for population-based interventions in the areas
of infant mortality, obesity, asthma, unintentional injuries, and early
childhood development.202 As one example, to address the high rate
of child obesity in Avondale, Ohio, Cincinnati Children’s plans to
work with local schools to improve nutrition education for students
and parents, promote better access to fresh produce, and support
Let’s Move It! programs in schools, the YMCA, and the Boys and
Girls Club.203
2. Lobbying Efforts
As providers increasingly appreciate the link between SDHs and
their financial success under the new payment reforms, they will
recognize the need for greater public action on these issues.
Consequently, payment reforms will spawn expanded lobbying by
the health care industry for government policies that improve public
health. For example, federal- and state-level providers may call on
elected officials to increase funding for public health or social
services programs such as SNAP or to enact more stringent
environmental laws or public health regulations.204 Locally, providers
may advocate for public health regulations such as no-smoking
200. See id. at 5.
201. See id.
202. See Cincinnati Children’s, About Cincinnati Children’s, CINCINNATI CHILDREN’S,
https://www.cincinnatichildrens.org/about/community/community-health (last vistited February 4,
2017).
203. See James M. Anderson Ctr. for Health Sys. Excellence, Reversing the Trend of Child Obesity,
CINCINNATI CHILDREN’S, http://www.cincinnatichildrens.org/service/j/anderson-center/communitypopulation-health/obesity/ (last vitisted February 4, 2017).
204. Cf. PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 105, at 49 (calling on providers to advocate
for health-related laws and regulations as part of their efforts to promote healthier communities);
Kathleen A. Barnes, Jason C. Kroening-Roche & Branden W. Comfort, The Developing Vision of
Primary Care, 367 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 891, 893 (2012) (stating that, as part of expanding their focus to
include upstream determinants of health, physicians should lobby for issues such as improved air quality
and increased public funding for the fight against childhood obesity).
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ordinances or sugary drink bans in schools.205 While providers’
lobbying efforts may not always overcome the political obstacles
discussed in Part II, as a well-financed special interest group, their
advocacy on SDH issues makes public action far more likely.206
B. Barriers in the Path of Greater Integration of Medicine, Public
Health, and Social Services
The emerging trend of providers addressing the social
determinants of health clearly holds great promise. Yet, a closer
examination of this trend reveals reasons for more tempered
optimism. Rather than target the SDHs that impact the long-term
health of the community as a whole, providers may narrowly focus
on SDH interventions that produce immediate improvement in the
health of individual patients. Moreover, many providers lack the
capacity to address certain SDHs, particularly the far upstream causes
of poor health that operate across populations.
1. Financial Considerations under Current Payment Reforms
As discussed above, providers have the flexibility to allocate their
resources toward a range of cost-effective interventions that address
the root causes of poor health. But before investing time and
resources in SDH initiatives, providers must consider the business
case for doing so, including the likelihood that their efforts will yield
a sufficient return on investment.207 The extent to which the ACA’s
205. Cf. Lawrence P. Casalino et al., Accountable Care Organizations and Population Health
Organizations, 40 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 819, 829–30 (2015) (describing the efforts of St.
Catherine Hospital in leading a coalition of community health partners that, among other things, helped
pass a no-smoking ordinance in Garden City, Kansas).
206. See Geoffrey R. Swain et al., Health Care Professionals: Opportunities to Address Social
Determinants of Health, 113 WIS. MED. J. 218, 221 (2014) (“[C]linicians’ participation in the policy
advocacy process makes such changes far more likely to succeed—all for the ultimate benefits of
patients, communities, and population health.”).
207. See CRAWFORD ET AL., supra note 29, at 9 (“Without appropriate financial incentives, ACOs
may find that it is not in their best interest to address social determinants of health and support initiatives
that impact future health status.”) While financial factors such as costs and revenue influence providers’
decisions on whether to address social determinants of health, other economic and noneconomic
concerns also impact the decisionmaking process, such as marketing and altruistic considerations. See
infra note 235 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, weak financial incentives make it less likely
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payment reforms motivate providers to address SDHs therefore
depends on the likelihood, magnitude, and timing of any financial
rewards to providers. Unfortunately, for the reasons discussed below,
the financial incentives under the current payment reform models
limit the type of SDH initiatives providers will pursue.
As discussed previously in Part III.A.1, the ACA ushered in new
payment models that reward providers who improve their patients’
health and lower costs while penalizing those who fail to do so.
These new payment models thus allow providers to financially
realize some of the benefits of SDH initiatives that successfully
address the root causes of poor health. While these financial
incentives have already motivated some providers to give greater
attention to SDHs, often the rewards and penalties are too low to
induce health care providers to invest in many of the promising
approaches to SDHs.208
To illustrate, assume that under a state’s Medicaid shared savings
program, ACOs that successfully lower per capita costs for their
Medicaid patient population receive 50% of the savings accruing to
the state from reduced Medicaid spending.209 Assume further that
each $1 spent on providing permanent supportive housing for
homeless Medicaid patients reduces Medicaid spending by $1.50.
Under this example, permanent supportive housing increases social
welfare, because the benefits of the program exceed its costs. Yet
from the perspective of the ACO, such an investment would not be
cost-effective; for each $1 the ACO spends on permanent supportive
housing it would receive a shared savings bonus of only 75 cents—
providers will invest in activities addressing the social determinants of health.
208. See CRAWFORD ET AL., supra note 29, at 9 (stating that shared savings is unlikely to incentivize
ACOs to adopt population health activities); Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 824 (“[M]ost existing
ACO contracts have relatively small financial incentives for improving the quality and controlling the
cost of health care, so the return on investments in improving geographic population health is likely to
be small.”).
209. Under the Medicare Shared Savings Program, ACOs participating in the one-sided model can
share up to 50 percent of the savings generated for the Medicare program, and ACOs participating in the
two-sided model can share up to 60 percent of any savings. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING SHARED SAVINGS AND LOSSES UNDER THE MEDICARE
SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM 6 (2014), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-ServicePayment/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/ACO_Methodology_Factsheet_ICN907405.pdf (describing
CMS’s methodology for determining shared savings).
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50% of the $1.50 savings generated for the state Medicaid program.
Consequently, the Medicaid ACO may choose not to invest in
permanent supportive housing despite its being an effective and
efficient approach to improving patients’ health.210
The limited scope of benefits captured by the new payment
models’ performance metrics also contributes to providers’
underinvestment in cost-effective SDH interventions. As explained
previously, the new payment models typically link a provider’s
reimbursements to their performance on various quality and cost
metrics, with higher-scoring providers receiving higher payments and
lower-scoring providers receiving reduced payments.211 The
performance metrics, however, do not broadly capture improved
health across a geographic community.212 Rather, the quality metrics
only measure the health status of a provider’s patients, while the cost
metrics reflect aggregate medical spending across the provider’s
patient panel.213 This encourages a provider to narrowly focus on the
health and treatment costs of its patient population,214 as
improvements in other individuals’ health have no impact on a
provider’s performance scores and reimbursements.215
As a result, providers have no business reason to take into account
the benefits of SDH initiatives that accrue to individuals who are not
210. See id.
211. See supra Part III.A.1.
212. See Noble & Casalino, supra note 168, at 1119.
213. See Nicholas W. Stine & Dave A. Chokshi, Opportunity in Austerity—A Common Agenda for
Medicine and Public Health, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 395, 396 (2012) (noting that “ACOs are held
accountable only for patients already in a particular health care system,” and not for all people in the
community); Noble & Casalino, supra note 168, at 1119 (observing that the thirty-three metrics adopted
under the Medicare Shared Savings Program do not have a link to geographic population health).
214. See Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 825–26 (ACOs have incentives to “control the cost and
improve the quality of care only for their attributed patients, not for the entire population of their
geographic area”). Indeed, for providers the term “population health” means their “panel of patients,”
whereas for public health professionals the term means “the entire population living in a geographic
area.” See CRAWFORD ET AL., supra note 29, at 3 (discussing how payors, providers, and public health
professionals view the term “population health”); Edie E. Zusman et al., Moving Toward
Implementation: The Potential for Accountable Care Organizations and Private-Public Partnerships to
Advance Active Neighborhood Design, 69 PREVENTATIVE MED. S98, S100 (2014) (discussing the
contrasting uses of the term “population health” by the ACA and public health).
215. See Noble & Casalino, supra note 168, at 1119 (commenting that metrics with no clear link to
the geographic population’s health “gives ACOs little incentive to focus on the health of everyone in the
communities in which they are located”).
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their patients.216 For example, a provider may discount or ignore the
benefits to nonpatients from establishing a farmers market or
expanding available green space. This may lead to an
underinvestment in cost-effective SDH initiatives, particularly
community-level initiatives that positively affect non-patients.217
Instead, providers likely will favor SDH interventions tailored to the
provider’s individual patients, such as addressing home conditions
that aggravate health conditions, helping patients enroll in public
assistance programs like SNAP, arranging transportation to and from
medical appointments, and counseling patients about disease
management and prevention.218
The new payment models’ performance metrics not only fail to
capture the health benefits to nonpatients, they also exclude nonhealth benefits.219 For example, SDH initiatives that improve housing
conditions and nutrition not only improve health but also may
increase school attendance rates and worker productivity.220 Yet,
216. See Edie E. Zusman et al., supra note 214, at S100 (stating that because the ACA’s payment
reforms are focused on an ACO’s patient panel, “[t]his may limit the activities the ACO is willing to
undertake if the immediate goal is to realize short-term cost savings within the specific population”);
Marc N. Gourevitch et al., The Challenge of Attribution: Responsibility for Population Health in the
Context of Accountable Care, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S322, S322 (Supp. 3, 2012) (finding that in areas
where no ACO is a dominant provider, such as urban areas, the population-level interventions
undertaken by ACOs for their patients are unlikely to align with the broader geographic community that
is the focus of public health).
217. Dominant providers who have a large market share may have economic incentives to adopt
community-level SDH programs, as most of the individuals benefiting from such interventions will be
patients of the provider. Cf. Gourevitch et al., supra note 216 (“In some rural or suburban areas where a
single ACO may be dominant, the ACO’s prevention and disease management efforts might naturally
align with population health improvement programs . . . .”); Glen P. Mays & F. Douglas Scutchfield,
Improving Public Health System Performance Through Multiorganizational Partnerships, 7
PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE A116, at 3 (2010) (“Organizations that serve large segments of the
community have strong incentives for partnership [with public health organizations] because they stand
to gain large shares of any public goods produced through collective action.”).
Perhaps providers could overcome this externality problem by forming partnerships where they
collectively address SDHs, such as jointly investing in a farmers market or new green spaces. In
practice, however, providers who view themselves as competitors (and who may fear antitrust
enforcement) may be hesitant to engage in collective action, a problem that may be aggravated by free
rider concerns.
218. See BUTLER, GRABINSKY & MASI, supra note 159, at 6, 7, 9, 10.
219. See id. at 13 (commenting that health care outcome measures do not capture certain benefits to
households and the community, such as rising employment or school attendance rates stemming from
improvements in housing or nutrition).
220. See id.
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current performance metrics do not capture these nonhealth benefits,
measuring only the quality of the medical care received and
aggregate medical spending.221 The benefits from SDH initiatives
that extend beyond the health sector therefore have no impact on the
performance scores that determine providers’ reimbursements under
the new payment models. Consequently, providers have no business
reason to take into account these nonhealth benefits when evaluating
SDH initiatives, leading to suboptimal investments in such
initiatives.222
The timing of financial rewards or penalties also may limit the
types of SDH initiatives providers pursue. Although some
interventions quickly generate improvements in health, others may
not produce benefits for years.223 For example, reducing air pollution
or children’s exposure to violence may not lower the incidence of
chronic disease until decades into the future. This means a provider’s
return on investment in the form of cost-savings, bonuses, and/or
higher reimbursement rates may not accrue until a future date that is
well outside the planning horizon of most providers.224 Consequently,
SDH interventions that do not produce health benefits until years into
the future may be unattractive to providers who desire financial
rewards within a short timeframe.225 Moreover, because a provider’s
patient population changes over time as patients move or switch to
other providers, a provider may not financially benefit from
long-term investments in improving the health of its current

221. See id.
222. See id. at 15–16 (evaluating the experience of Washington Adventist Hospital and its SDH
initiatives and finding that if payment models do not capture the broader benefits of SDH initiatives, this
results in providers holding back funding for SDH initiatives).
223. See Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 864.
224. See id. at 212 (stating that SDH investments “may not produce benefits for many years,” and that
this “is far outside the planning horizon of hospital and medical group leaders”); Ingram, Scutchfield &
Costich, supra note 116, at 842 (reporting that survey respondents noted that the long time horizons for
a return on investment under the public health model is inconsistent with the orientation of ACOs
toward “shared savings in a relatively short time frame”); cf. Mays & Scutchfield, supra note 217, at 2–
3 (explaining that long time lags before the benefits of provider-public health partnerships materialize
weakens the economic incentives to engage in such partnerships, “especially for investor-owned
organizations that operate under short-term financial expectations”).
225. See supra note 176.
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patients.226 Providers, therefore, may favor SDH initiatives with more
immediate benefits, such as addressing housing conditions that
aggravate asthma, leaving long-term determinants of health
unaddressed.
Uncertainty as to which strategies are most effective and efficient
also may deter providers from pursuing SDH interventions. Before
investing in programs that target the root causes of poor health,
providers may want assurance that their investments will yield
improvements in health outcomes and reduced spending.227
Unfortunately, our understanding of which SDH interventions
actually improve health and which are most cost-effective is
limited.228 The absence of evidence as to whether investments in
SDH programs will yield a positive return on investment may make
some providers leery of such investments.229 In particular, providers
may be reluctant to serve as social laboratories testing innovative
approaches for addressing SDHs despite having the flexibility to do
so.230
Finally, current payment methodologies often penalize providers
whose interventions successfully ameliorate the social,
environmental, and behavioral causes of poor health. By definition,
cost-effective SDH interventions are cost-effective because they
reduce future medical costs by lowering the incidence of disease and
226. See Noble & Casalino, supra note 168, at 1119 (stating that, since patients attributed to an ACO
may change annually, ACOs have little incentive to focus on “long-term determinants of health in the
patients for whom they are accountable in the present”); Edie E. Zusman et al., supra note 214, at S100
(“[B]ecause health plan membership changes over time, some ACO leadership may feel that it is not
cost-effective to invest in longer-term behavior change strategies.”).
227. See KELLY DEVERS ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., INNOVATIVE MEDICAID
INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE SERVICE DELIVERY AND QUALITY OF CARE 18 (2011),
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8224.pdf (summarizing the comments of a
workgroup participant who emphasized that stakeholders, including providers, “want[] to know that
their investment is resulting in the desired short and long-term quality and cost results”).
228. See MCGOVERN, MILLER & HUGHES-CROMWICK, supra note 41, at 7–8 (“[There] is the need for
more robust data on what produces health, and the effectiveness of interventions that work through
health determinants to produce health . . . .”); Braveman, Egerter & Williams, supra note 25, at 389
(“[W]e know little about effective ways to address social factors to improve health and reduce health
disparities . . . .”).
229. Cf. BUTLER, GRABINSKY & MASI, supra note 159, at 13 (“The difficulty of identifying a specific
and complete [return on investment] dollar amount can make it hard for a hospital’s chief financial
officer to justify population investments.”).
230. See id.
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decreasing medical emergencies.231 For example, eliminating mold
and other environmental irritants reduces emergency room visits and
medical complications among asthmatics.232 Yet lower demand for
medical care means a loss of revenue for providers paid in whole or
in part based on the volume of care provided, that is, providers paid
under the fee-for-service.233 Providers paid under capitation or global
budgets similarly may fear that reduced demand for medical care will
translate into lower revenue for them, because reduced demand may
lead payors to lower their capitated payment amounts or global
budgets.234 Providers who invest in SDH initiatives therefore risk
lower revenues should they successfully reduce the need for their
services.
This discussion is not meant to suggest that providers’ decisions
on whether and in what manner to address SDHs are influenced
solely by the financial incentives created under the new payment
models. Other business considerations also may influence a
providers’ decision to invest in a SDH initiative, such as visibility
that confers reputational or political advantages.235 And many health
231. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
232. See Crossley, supra note 107.
233. See BUTLER, GRABINSKY & MASI, supra note 159, at 16–17 (stating that hospitals’ strategies to
address population health needs generally are not sustainable under fee-for-service, because preventing
the need to seek care at the hospital or its emergency department “directly reduce[s] business and
revenue for the hospital”); Mays & Scutchfield, supra note 217, at 2 (commenting that public health
partnerships between providers and others that “increase the reach of underused but cost-effective
clinical preventive services”—for example, vaccinations or family planning services—and “increase
implementation of and compliance with nonclinical public health programs and policies”—like
environmental changes that promote nutrition and physician activity—may cause some physicians and
hospitals to lose revenue from reduced need for medical care). Some providers, particularly nonprofit
hospitals, may realize some savings from SDH programs due to declining demand for uncompensated
care among uninsured populations. See Mays & Sutchfield, supra note 217, at 3. As noted in Part III,
however, the demand for uncompensated care has declined as the uninsured population has shrunk
following implementation of the ACA. Consequently, the savings from SDH programs accruing to
providers of uncompensated care may be insufficient to off-set their loss of revenue from insured
populations whose health improves.
234. Cf. BUTLER, GRABINSKY & MASI, supra note 159, at 16 (noting the concerns of Washington
Adventist Hospital (WAH), which is paid under Maryland’s global budgeting initiative, that “if the
hospital does a particularly good job in reducing the volume of admitted patients, then the state may
press for a lower budget for WAH in subsequent years”).
235. See Mays & Scutchfield, supra note 217, at 2 (stating that the economic incentives that motivate
organizations to pursue SHD initiatives include “achiev[ing] visibility and recognition that confers a
political or marketing advantage”).
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care organizations, particularly nonprofits, are guided in part by an
altruistic desire to improve the health of their patients and
communities.236 Nevertheless, all providers, even nonprofit
organizations, must ensure that their enterprises remain economically
viable. The financial incentives under the payment reform models
therefore play a major role in shaping providers’ SDH investment
decisions.
In sum, although recent payment reforms clearly push the health
care system to expand its focus beyond the clinical setting and
address the root causes of poor health, the types of SDH initiatives
pursued by providers will be of limited range. Specifically, providers
will likely focus their attention on SDH initiatives known to produce
significant near-term improvements in the health of the providers’
patient population. Less appealing to providers are SDH initiatives
that yield health benefits far into the future and innovative SDH
initiatives with uncertain payoffs. Providers also are likely to
underinvest in SDH initiatives that yield positive externalities,
namely improving the health of individuals who are not the
providers’ patients and nonhealth related benefits such as higher
worker productivity.
2. Incentives for Tax-Exempt Hospitals
As discussed in Part III.A, many public health professionals and
scholars believe the new CHNA requirements will prompt taxexempt hospitals to satisfy their community benefit obligations by
addressing SDHs. Indeed, examples of hospitals doing just that are
easily found. Yet, asking hospitals to address their community’s
SDHs “is truly asking something new of most hospitals,”237 and it is
not clear that the CHNA requirements in practice will induce most
tax-exempt hospitals to make this shift.238

236. See id. (stating that while organizations may contribute voluntarily to SDH initiatives for
economic reasons, “[m]any organizations also may have noneconomic motives to contribute, such as an
altruistic mission to improve health and social welfare”).
237. Crossley, supra note 107, at 57.
238. See id.
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Advocates have high hopes that the new CHNA requirements,
particularly the requirement that hospitals solicit community input,
will encourage tax-exempt hospitals to do more to address SDHs.239
However, hospitals retain broad discretion in determining the
significance of and prioritizing their community’s health needs.240
Mary Crossley contends that this broad discretion “make[s] it too
easy for hospitals to ‘think small’” and avoid addressing the key
SDHs adversely impacting their communities’ health.241 For
example, a hospital may prioritize a health need that advances its
business interests, such as health screenings that generate demand for
the hospital’s services, but is less important from a public health
perspective.242
Hospitals also retain broad discretion as to how best to address the
priorities reflected in their CHNA. Consequently, while some
hospitals may target the root causes of poor health, others may focus
on the clinical aspects of an issue, such as expanding the availability
of medical services.243 For example, hospitals that prioritize
premature births could respond by identifying and addressing the
upstream behavioral, social, and environmental factors that
contribute to premature births, such as smoking or food insecurity.
But, hospitals also could address their communities’ high premature
birth rates by expanding related medical services, such as adding
beds to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) and recruiting more
neonatologists to the community.244 While increasing the availability
and quality of medical care can be of great value to a community, for
239. See supra Part III.A.2.
240. See Crossley, supra note 107, at 69 (stating that the IRS regulations give deference to hospitals’
judgment on whether a community health need is significant and should be given priority).
241. Id.
242. Cf. id. at 69–70 (“The Regulations[] . . . permit a hospital to identify as ‘significant’ and to
prioritize a health need that, from a public health perspective on community health, may be relatively
inconsequential.”).
243. See id. 76–78 (discussing the different natures of hospitals’ responses to community needs).
244. Cf. Steven Ross Johnson, Obamacare Rule Has Hospitals Targeting Health Improvement, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140614/MAGAZINE/306149803
(comparing how Detroit’s Henry Ford Health System elected to partner with community organizations
to address factors contributing to infant mortality, while Chicago’s Advocate Trinity Hospital chose to
address its community’s high rates of stroke, heart disease and cancer by investing in a primary stroke
center, a second heart catheterization lab, and new radiology equipment).
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some health needs, addressing nonclinical factors that undermine
health is the more effective response.245 The CHNA regulations,
however, do not prod hospitals toward the latter.
In addition, uncertainty over whether SDH programs count toward
hospitals’ community benefit obligations246 may undermine
hospitals’ enthusiasm for such programs. As explained in Part III, a
tax-exempt hospital must annually report to the IRS its community
benefit activities on Schedule H. In its definition of community
benefit activities, Schedule H’s instructions include charity care,
health professions education, subsidized health services, research,
and community health improvement,247 which the IRS defines as
“activities or programs . . . for the express purpose of improving
community health.”248 Hospitals also must separately report on
Schedule H their “community building activities,”defined to include
physical improvements, housing, economic development, community
support, environmental improvements, and community health
improvement advocacy.249 Although the Schedule H instructions
state that “some” community building activities also count as
community benefit activities, the IRS did not specify which
community building activities also qualify as community benefit
activities and which do not.250 This ambiguity encourages hospitals
wishing to play it safe from a tax-exemption perspective to favor
conventional strategies for addressing community health needs that
clearly fall within the community benefit definition, such as charity
care, physician recruitment, free health screenings, and health
fairs.251
245. See generally sources cited supra notes 25 and 29; see also supra Part I (discussing the
significant impact of nonclinical factors on health).
246. The IRS has made clear that a hospital’s CHNA obligations do not displace the community
benefit standard. See Community Health Needs Assessments for Charitable Hospitals, 79 Fed. Reg.
78,954 (Dec. 31, 2014).
247. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE H (FORM 990) (2015).
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See Crossley, supra note 107, at 63 (“[C]reating [these different] reporting categories for
‘community health improvement services’ and ‘community building activities’ . . . may have sown
confusion that now impedes hospitals’ embrace of activities addressing broad social determinants of
health.”).
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Studies of hospitals’ initial rounds of CHNA reports suggest that,
while the CHNA requirements have prodded some hospitals to “think
big,” for most it is business as usual.252 A review of 95 Texas
nonprofit hospitals’ CHNA reports found that in prioritizing their
communities’ health needs, hospitals de-emphasized SDHs.253
Almost half of hospitals’ priorities related to health systems issues,
most notably increasing access to care; almost 40% of their priorities
related to health conditions.254 Health behaviors such as smoking and
poor nutrition comprised only 9% of the identified priorities, with
community conditions comprising less than 5%.255 The authors
similarly found that hospitals’ strategies for addressing health
priorities largely involved a continuation of existing programs, with
over 70% implementing community benefits activities “as they had
in the past.”256
Among hospitals included in the Texas study, many of the
hospitals’ activities reflect a traditional focus on medical services,
such as health fair screenings, physician recruitment, telemedicine
programs, and integrated delivery systems.257 Only 9% of hospitals’
CHNA reports revealed hospitals willing to implement strategies
outside their traditional scope of activities, such as partnering with
community organizations or operating a farmers’ market.258 A study
of North Carolina hospitals’ CHNA reports similarly found that
hospitals’ implementation strategies emphasized access and quality
of clinical care over SDHs,259 as did a study of a national sample of

252. See id.
253. See Cara L. Pennel et al., Community Health Needs Assessment: Potential for Population Health
Improvement, 19 POPULATION HEALTH MGMT. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3).
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id. (manuscript at 4).
257. See id. (listing some hospital implementation strategies).
258. See id. (manuscript at 5).
259. See KAREN WADE & GENE W. MATTHEWS, THE NETWORK FOR PUB. HEALTH LAW, REVIEW OF
NORTH CAROLINA HOSPITALS’ COMMUNITY HEALTH NEEDS ASSESSMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION
STRATEGIES 4 (2014), https://www.networkforphl.org/_asset/r1gg6w/Network-NC-CHNA-Report.pdf
(reporting that among the 116 priorities selected by the 30 hospitals in the study sample, 64 related to
clinical care, 37 related to health behaviors, 7 related to both clinical care and health behaviors, 5 related
to social and economic factors, and none related to the physical environment).
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CHNA reports.260 The authors of the Texas study further concluded
that half of the hospitals “did not address or did a very poor job of
addressing underlying etiologies of health problems,” with only 7%
doing “a good or better job of expressing an understanding of root
causes of needs being addressed.”261 Finally, the authors found that
almost three-fourths of hospitals “did not address or did a very poor
job of addressing social determinants of health by identifying issues
influencing health or implementing strategies addressing these
determinants.”262
The Texas study suggests a possible explanation for these
disappointing results: most hospitals have interpreted the CHNA
requirements as simply requiring hospitals to improve documentation
and reporting of their community benefit activities, rather than
encouraging hospitals to embrace broader population health
activities.263 This in part may reflect the fact that the CHNA
regulations, like the community benefit standard, do not require that
hospitals’ activities actually improve community health.264
260. See PUB. HEALTH INST., SUPPORTING ALIGNMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN COMMUNITY
HEALTH IMPROVEMENT: THE DEVELOPMENT AND PILOTING OF A REGIONAL DATA-SHARING SYSTEM
65 (2014), http://nnphi.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/SupportingAlignmentAndAccountabilityIn
CommunityHealthImprovement.pdf (finding that among the 44 hospitals included in the study’s sample,
67% of the selected priorities fell in the clinical care category, with 26% of priorities in the health
behaviors category, 6% in the social and economic factors category, and non in the physical
environment category).
261. Pennel et al., supra note 253 (manuscript at 5). The remaining 43% of hospitals had midrange
scores on the relevant criteria. See id.
262. Id.
263. See id. (manuscript at 6).
264. Crossley, supra note 107, at 104–105. The CHNA regulations only set forth procedural
requirements for hospitals, such as the requirements to conduct a community health needs assessment,
prioritize community health needs, and implement and report on strategies to address the selected
community health needs. See id. They do not establish any performance benchmarks or other
accountability measures that would require hospitals to achieve a degree of success in addressing
community health needs. See id. Although hospitals must evaluate and report on the impact of their
community health activities, Treas. Reg. § 1.501(r)-3(b)(6)(F), this may “not [be] enough to maximize
opportunities for real changes in community health.” See id.
Weak IRS enforcement also may reinforce the status quo. The IRS’s history of lax enforcement of the
community benefits standard suggests it may similarly fail to closely scrutinize hospitals’ compliance
with the CHNA regulations. See Crossley, supra note 107, at 82 (“Realistically, though, the history of
lax IRS enforcement of the community benefit standard and current reality of shrinking agency budgets
suggests it is unlikely that the IRS will closely police hospitals’ compliance with whatever guidance it
provides.”). Moreover, even if a hospital fails to perform it CHNA obligations, the IRS is unlikely to
revoke its tax-exempt status given its historical reluctance to take this drastic step, leaving a hospital to
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Obviously the CHNA requirements are a new obligation for taxexempt hospitals, and in time, perhaps more of hospitals’ CHNArelated activities will address SDHs. Yet, with today’s hospitals
subject to various financial pressures and regulatory obligations,
understandably they “may be unlikely to do more than the bare
minimum” necessary to satisfy the new CHNA requirements.265 In
practice, then, the CHNA obligations may prompt few tax-exempt
hospitals to broaden their focus beyond traditional community benefit
activities and direct more resources toward upstream causes of poor
health.266
3. Providers’ Limited Capacity to Address the Social Determinants
of Health
Even if the ACA reforms do, in fact, motivate providers to address
the upstream causes of poor health, some commentators have
questioned whether providers have the ability to do so.267 Improving
the social, environmental, and behavioral conditions affecting the
population’s health requires a range of resources and competencies
beyond providers’ current capacity. Busy health professionals trained
in the biomedical model lack the skills necessary to assess and
develop strategies for addressing SDHs.268 Indeed, a 2011 survey of
physicians found that while most believe that unmet social needs
adversely impact their patients’ health, physicians do not feel that
face a relatively small tax penalty of only $50,000. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(2)(2) (2015).
265. See Mary Crossley, Tax-Exempt Hospitals, Community Health Needs and Addressing
Disparities, 55 HOW. L.J. 687, 701 (2012).
266. See id. at 701–02 (“[W]ithout meaningful prodding by the IRS, most hospitals may be unlikely
to . . . widen[] their focus to include not only individual patients but population-level health needs.”).
267. See, e.g., Noble & Casalino, supra note 168, at 1119 (questioning whether ACOs have the
capabilities to be responsible for a geographic population’s health); Casalino et al., supra note 205, at
831 (stating that ACOs and hospitals have engaged in only modest efforts to address the SDHs given
their lack of capabilities, as well as weak incentives to do so); Jeff Goldsmith, Moral Failure and Health
Care Costs: Two Simplistic Spending Narratives, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 27, 2015),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/10/27/moral-failure-and-health-costs-two-simplistic-spendingnarratives/ (asserting that progressives “overestimate the capacity of the health system to improve the
health of the population”).
268. See ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HEALTH CARE’S BLIND SIDE: THE OVERLOOKED
CONNECTION BETWEEN SOCIAL NEEDS AND GOOD HEALTH: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM A SURVEY
OF AMERICA’S PHYSICIANS 1 (2011), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/surveys_and_polls/
2011/rwjf71795.
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they have the capacity to address these needs.269 Similarly, hospitals
and other large provider organizations’ core competencies relate to
the provision of medical care, and not community health.270 Despite
these challenges, some providers are well-positioned to shift their
orientation beyond their clinical walls; many, however, face very real
obstacles to effectively addressing SDHs.
Fundamental changes in the structure and delivery of health care
have led to a surge in the number of larger organizations that have, or
can develop, the capacity to address the upstream causes of poor
health. Many physicians, hospitals, and other providers have
concluded that forming partnerships with one another facilitates
success under the emerging payment models described above.271
Recent years thus have seen significant growth in the formation of
large provider organizations, such as ACOs, integrated delivery
systems, and multi-specialty physician groups.272 Relatedly, an
increasing number of physicians are electing to become salaried
employees of hospitals or health systems, rather than practicing in
solo or small group settings.273 So although not all health
269. See id.
270. See Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 824–25 (ACOs, hospitals, and medical groups’ “core
capabilities relate to the provision of medical care”); Edie E. Zusman et al., supra note 214 at S100
(“Hospitals and physician practices are still somewhat inexperienced with population health and
community wellness programs . . . .”).
271. See Jessica Mantel, The Myth of the Independent Physician: Implications for Health Law, Policy,
and Ethics, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 455, 467–68 (2013) (describing why payment reforms that link
reimbursement to outcomes, along with other industry trends, have encouraged the formation of larger,
clinically integrated organizations).
272. See Muhlestein, supra note 115 (reporting on the continued expansion of the accountable care
movement in 2015); SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42880, PHYSICIAN
PRACTICES: BACKGROUND, ORGANIZATION, AND MARKET CONSOLIDATION (2013) (describing the
trend of a growing number of U.S. physicians combining their practices and affiliating with hospitals
and others as “part of a broader trend toward consolidation” in the health care sector). For example,
according to Leavitt Partners, a consulting firm that has tracked ACOs since 2010, from spring 2014 to
spring 2015 approximately 120 organizations became ACOs, bringing the total number of ACOs to 744
from an initial count of 64 in 2011. See Muhlestein, supra note 115.
273. See CAROL K. KANE, AM. MED. ASS’N, POLICY RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES: UPDATED DATA ON
PHYSICIAN PRACTICE ARRANGEMENTS: INCHING TOWARD HOSPITAL OWNERSHIP 1 (2015) (reporting
that the percentage of physicians who are owners of their practices fell from 76.1% in 1983 to 50.8% in
2014, and that the percentage of physicians working directly for a hospital or in a practice owned in
whole or in part by a hospital increased from 29% in 2012 to 32.8% in 2014); W. Pete Welch et al.,
Proportion of Physicians in Large Group Practices Continued to Grow in 2009–11, 32 HEALTH AFF.
1659, 1659 (2013) (reporting that the percentage of physicians practicing in groups of more than fifty
continues to grow, increasing from 30.9% in 2009 to 35.6% in 2011).
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professionals currently practice in large organizations, the trend is
clear: the health care system is quickly shifting toward one
dominated by larger organizations.
Larger organizations generally have, or are positioned to acquire,
many of the competencies necessary to address SDHs.274 Larger
organizations are better financed than smaller providers and therefore
have more resources available to devote to their patients’ nonclinical
needs.275 Their larger workforces often include nonclinical
professionals with the expertise to address patients’ social needs,
such as social workers, community health workers, dieticians, and
even lawyers.276 In addition, large organizations’ core capabilities
typically include the ability to conduct sophisticated data analysis
such as identifying health trends across patient populations or risk
factors for future disease or complications.277 Such data analyses in
274. See generally Jacobi, supra note 36, at 103 (stating that large organizations such as total
accountable care organizations (TACOs) have the funding and capacity to provide a broad range of
services); Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 824 (stating that many ACOs, particularly those that include
a hospital or hospital system, have considerable financial and social capital that could be used to support
efforts to address socioeconomic factors that impact health).
275. See MARK W. FREIDBERG ET AL., EFFECTS OF HEALTH CARE PAYMENT MODELS ON PHYSICIAN
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES xvi–xvii (2015), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
research_reports/RR800/RR869/RAND_RR869.pdf (noting that physician practices must make
substantive investments in infrastructure in response to emerging, alternative payment modes, and that
for smaller physician practices this often means merging with larger practices or hospitals in order to
access the necessary capital); AM. HOSP. ASS’N, THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR RURAL
HOSPITALS IN AN ERA OF HEALTH REFORM 1 (2011), http://www.aha.org/research/reports/tw/11apr-twrural.pdf (explaining the financial pressures on rural hospitals, including the fact that they “operate with
modest balance sheets and have more difficulty than larger organizations accessing capital to invest”);
JASON H. SUSSMAN & ERIC A. JORDAHL, KAUFMAN, HALL & ASSOCS., INC., A GUIDE TO FINANCING
STRATEGIES FOR HOSPITALS WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION FOR SMALLER HOSPITALS 3 (2010),
http://www.hpoe.org/Reports-HPOE/capitalfinance12.2010.pdf (explaining that while most hospitals
face more limited capital access, including fewer borrowing options and higher cost of capital, “[t]his is
especially true for smaller hospitals, which have almost always experienced a more difficult time
accessing capital than larger organizations”).
276. See Shana F. Sandberg et al., Hennepin Health: A Safety-Net Accountable Care Organization for
the Expanded Medicaid Population, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1975, 1978 (2014) (describing how Hennepin
Health has established interdisciplinary teams that include social workers and community health
workers); Martin et al., supra note 162 (describing a growing trend of including lawyers in
interdisciplinary teams that broadly address patients health needs).
277. See Hacker & Walker, supra note 198, at 1164 (discussing how the emergence of electronic
medical records will allow an ACO to “become more facile at viewing their population as a whole and
identifying trends across their panel’s health . . . [and how with] adequate health information
technology, systems can now examine issues such as risk for future disease, comorbidities, and quality
metrics across a defined population”).
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turn support the implementation of effective public health and social
interventions.278 Thus, as the health care system continues to shift
from small providers to larger organizations, providers’ capacity to
address SDHs also will expand.
Nevertheless, barriers remain. A 2013 survey of hospital
administrators conducted by the American Hospital Association
found that while many have expanded their focus to include
population health, they face challenges in adequately staffing their
SDH initiatives.279 Survey respondents identified a growing need for
professionals skilled in population health management, including
skills in “conducting and implementing community health needs
assessments, developing community-based partnerships, and
applying health information technology to population health.”280
Unfortunately, few institutions of higher education offer courses
teaching these subjects.281 In the near-term, then, a shortage of
professionals skilled in population health may limit hospitals and
other provider organizations’ capacity for addressing SDHs,
particularly at the community level.
In contrast to large providers, smaller providers generally lack the
resources to support SDH initiatives.282 For example, a 2012
American Hospital Association survey of hospitals found that leaders
at larger facilities are more focused on population health than those at
smaller facilities, in part because the latter “typically will have
neither the human capital nor the financial resources to implement
overarching population health strategies in ways comparable to larger
facilities.”283 Small and medium-sized physician practices also are
278. Cf. CRAWFORD ET AL., supra note 29, at 13 (“Acquisition and use of pertinent and timely health
data are critical precursors to addressing population health.”).
279. See TRENDS IN HOSPITAL-BASED POPULATION HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 110, at
16–17.
280. Id. at 18.
281. See id.
282. See DEVERS ET AL., supra note 227 (reporting that respondents to a survey noted that “primary
care practices and their staff need help in transitioning to [patient-centered medical home] models”);
TAKACH & BUXBAUM, supra note 185, at 9 (noting that most primary care providers work in resourcelimited small or medium-sized practices that will have difficulty effectively managing patients’ complex
health needs, “creating the need for strategies to ensure practices have the capacity to meet the needs of
complex patients”).
283. HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TR., MANAGING POPULATION HEALTH: THE ROLE OF THE HOSPITAL 7
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poorly equipped to independently shift to the new models of care that
address SDHs, such as the patient-centered medical home.284
To address the latter challenge, some states have initiated
programs that help physician practices transition to the patientcentered medical home model.285 For example, some states are
providing start-up funding to physician practices and funding
interdisciplinary community health teams that support multiple
physician practices.286 Other states, however, are providing little or
no assistance to small and medium-sized physician groups seeking to
transition to the patient-centered medical home model.287 Congress
partially filled this gap with recent legislation authorizing $20 million
in annual funding for 2016–2020 for physician practices transitioning
to patient-centered medical homes and other innovative models of
care.288 Although these state and federal efforts are promising, they
are unlikely to reach many physician practices and do nothing to
support smaller hospitals.
Providers, both small and large, also are ill-equipped to directly
address broad, structural causes of poor health. For example, while
providers can help individual asthma patients address the
environmental irritants in their home that aggravate their condition,
(2012), http://www.hpoe.org/Reports-HPOE/managing_population_health.pdf.
284. See TERRY MCGEENEY, BDC ADVISORS, TRANSITIONING PATIENT-CENTERED MEDICAL HOMES
TO CLINICALLY INTEGRATED MEDICAL NEIGHBORHOODS: PCMHS AND MEDICAL NEIGHBORHOODS
PROVIDE A PATHWAY TO CLINICALLY INTEGRATED PHYSICIAN NETWORKS AND ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATIONS 6 (2013), http://www.bdcadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Transitioning_
Patient-Centered_Medical_Homes_to_Clinically_Integrated_Medical_Neighborhoods.pdf (“Many small
and medium-sized physician practices lack the resources to seek [patient-centered medical home]
qualification.”).
285. See DEVERS ET AL., supra note 227.
286. See id. A handful of states, including Oregon and Pennsylvania, provide start-up funds to
providers transitioning to the medical home model, which can be used to hire new staff and pay for
other structural changes. See id. In addition, at least 8 state Medicaid programs are funding
interdisciplinary community health teams that support multiple primary care practices functioning as
medical homes. See id. In these states centrally located state or regionally-based community health
teams relieve primary care providers from having to each establish and fund their own interdisciplinary
team to coordinate patients’ clinical and nonclinical needs. See id. See also TAKACH & BUXBAUM, supra
note 185 (describing the functions of community health teams). States supporting community health
teams include Alabama, Maine, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Vermont. See
DEVERS ET AL., supra note 227.
287. See DEVERS ET AL., supra note 227.
288. See Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, § (11)(B), Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129
Stat. 87, 110–11 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4).
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they cannot address pollution or other environmental hazards that
operate across a geographic area.289 Similarly, providers can promote
exercise through individual counseling and education programs, but
few have the resources to increase a community’s available green
spaces.290 Providers also can do little to improve a community’s
schools, upgrade its housing stock, or reduce unemployment,
poverty, or crime rates.291 Nor do providers have the legal authority
to adopt and enforce public health policies, such as smoking bans and
clean indoor air laws.292
The growing volume of provider-sponsored SDH initiatives
reveals an emerging trend of providers moving beyond the
biomedical paradigm in response to the ACA reforms discussed in
Part II. Yet upon closer examination, these policy changes create
weaker incentives for providers to address SDHs than first glance
suggests. Moreover, the financial incentives under the new payment
models encourage providers to narrowly focus on SDH initiatives
that produce near-term improvements in the health of individual
patients, rather than long-term improvements to the health of the
broader community. Many providers also lack the capacity to address
SDHs, and few on their own can effectively tackle far upstream
social and environmental causes of poor health, such as pollution,
poverty, and crime.
In presenting a less optimistic view of providers’ growing efforts
to address SDHs, this article does not mean to suggest that providers’
SDH initiatives are of limited value. These efforts have a very real
and positive impact on the health of many individuals, and rightly
289. See Braunstein & Lavizzo-Mourey, supra note 29.
290. See generally Ross C. Brownson et al., Environmental and Policy Determinants of Physical
Activity in the United States, 12 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1995 (2001).
291. See Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 824 (“ACOs are composed of provider organizations
(primarily hospitals and medical groups) whose core capabilities relate to the provision of medical care.
Their expertise does not lie in improving housing or education, reducing poverty, changing the built
environment, or leading public health initiatives.”); Braunstein & Lavizzo-Mourey, supra note 29, at
2042 (“The root causes of poor health experienced by many who live in low-income neighborhoods—
such as the lack of access to health care, limited food choices, and exposure to environmental hazards—
are well documents, but often go beyond the scope of the health care delivery system.”).
292. See Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 824 (“ACOs are not the government. They lack the legal
authority that government agencies possess to intervene to improve socioeconomic factors.”).
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should be viewed as an encouraging development. But at present, this
emerging trend is only a partial solution to America’s neglect of the
social, environmental, and behavioral causes of poor health. Moving
forward, the challenge for policymakers will be developing policies
that strengthen providers’ incentives to address SDHs and enhance
their capacity to do so. A comprehensive discussion of this challenge
is beyond the scope of this Article. Part V, however, begins the
discussion by presenting a vision for the health care system of
tomorrow—Population Health Partnerships—and highlighting some
of the obstacles to making this vision a reality.
V. A VISION FOR THE FUTURE: POPULATION HEALTH PARTNERSHIPS
In recognition of providers’ limited capacity to address the full
range of SDHs, health policy experts increasingly are calling for
providers to work collectively with other sectors to improve the
population’s health.293 These Population Health Partnerships (PHPs),
as I call them,294 would involve participating organizations
coordinating their activities in pursuit of shared population health
objectives. These objectives could include a single, specific goal,
such as reducing childhood obesity, or a broad range of health
concerns. In their most advanced form, PHPs would (1) assess and
prioritize a population’s health needs, (2) develop a collective,
comprehensive strategy for addressing those needs, (3) coordinate
293. See, e.g., Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 829 (discussing calls for the creation of “integrator”
coalitions given that ACOs and hospitals are unlikely to have the capabilities to fundamentally change
the socioeconomic determinants of health); TRICIA MCGINNIS, MAIA CRAWFORD & STEPHEN A.
SOMERS, A STATE POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRATING HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES 2 (2014),
http://www.sashvt.org/CommonwealthFundreport.pdf (describing the “new vision for integrating health
and social services”); Mays & Scutchfield, supra note 217, at 1–2 (discussing public health partnerships,
where participants from across sectors collectively undertaking to promote health and prevent disease in
populations); William H. Dietz et al., An Integrated Framework For The Prevention And Treatment Of
Obesity And Its Related Chronic Diseases, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1456, 1458 (2015) (calling for integration
between care delivery and multiple community systems); Stephen M. Shortell, Challenges and
Opportunities for Population Health Partnerships, 7 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE A114, 2 (2010)
(advocating for community health management systems built upon partnerships between providers, local
health departments, and other community organizations).
294. These cross-sector coalitions also have be called community health systems, population health
organizations, accountable care communities, and accountable health communities. See Casalino et al.,
supra note 205, at 829.
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participants’ activities and the sharing of resources and data, and (4)
evaluate the PHP’s success in achieving its goals.295 Toward that end,
the PHP would include a broad coalition of organizations in addition
to health providers: local public health departments; other
governmental agencies such as schools, public safety, housing, parks
and recreation departments; social services organizations such as
food pantries, homeless shelters; civic organizations like the YMCA,
and Girls and Boys Clubs; faith-based groups; academics; payors;
and business groups.296 By combining their expertise and resources in
pursuit of shared community health goals, those participating in a
PHP would collectively achieve greater improvements in health than
would be possible through each acting independently.297
To illustrate, consider the problem of obesity. Provider-based
efforts to improve diet and increase physical activity, such as patient
counseling and on-site weight management programs,”will not
succeed without complementary community systems that make
healthier choices the default or easier option.”298 For example,
patients motivated to improve their diets and exercise more also need
access to healthy food and safe places for physical activity.

Toward that end, a PHP could support a coordinated,
comprehensive strategy to address a community’s obesity problem
that would include a range of policies and activities, such as:
295. See Shortell, supra note 293, at 2 (describing the function of a community health management
system); Dietz et al., supra note 293, at 1459 (identifying the functions that the integrator of an
integrated cross-sector partnership must perform). A Population Health Partnership would require the
leadership of an integrator, an entity whose responsibilities would include the following: overseeing the
development of the partnership’s mission and agenda, coordinating the partnership’s activities,
supporting the sharing of data, identifying and accessing funding, managing the partnership’s budget,
allocated resources, and holding participating organizations accountable for their performance. See id.
(discussing an integrator’s multiple roles); Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 829.
296. See Dietz et al., supra note 293, at 1458 (listing key stakeholders); Casalino et al., supra note
205, at 829 (listing other sectors that address SDHs); PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note
105, at 28 (listing community groups striving for population health improvements).
297. See Mays & Scutchfield, supra note 217, at 1–2 (discussing the benefits of public health
partnerships).
298. Dietz et al., supra note 293, at 1457.
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Eliminating a community’s food deserts by
subsidizing new grocery stores, farmers markets, or
food pantries;
 Helping individuals with food insecurity issues
enroll in public assistance programs such as SNAP
or connecting them with local organizations such as
food pantries;
 Increasing available green spaces or recreation
centers;
 Improving the safety of local parks;
 Launching a public awareness campaign that
educates the community on the importance of
nutrition and physical exercise; and
 Increasing students’ opportunities for physical
activity and healthy lunch options in schools.
Data collected by providers and others, such as patients’ body
mass index (BMI), could help identify the most vulnerable
neighborhoods and populations, thereby ensuring that resources are
targeted to those most in need. The PHP also could develop metrics
to assess whether the partnership is achieving its goal of reducing
obesity.
Early efforts to implement PHPs abound.299 For example, as
discussed in Part III.B., Cincinnati Children’s is working with
schools, local government agencies, and community groups to
address infant mortality, obesity, asthma, unintentional injuries, and
early childhood development.300 Providers in Summit County, Ohio
299. See, e.g., Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 831–32 (describing “early efforts” to implement
partnerships between providers, public health organizations, and other sectors); Dietz et al., supra note
293 (discussing examples of cross-sector partnerships to address obesity); Stephen Somers & Tricia
McGinnis, Broadening the ACA Story: A Totally Accountable Care Organization, HEALTH AFF. BLOG
(Jan. 23, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/01/23/broadening-the-aca-story-a-totally-accountablecare-organization/ (discussing the Hennepin Health Medicaid ACO and similar cross-sector
partnerships); Braunstein & Lavizzo-Mourey, supra note 29 (highlighting examples of partnerships
between the health and community development field). A 2013 survey of hospitals found that many
have partnered with community and civic organizations on population health initiatives, with hospitals
averaging 8.63 such partnerships. See TRENDS IN HOSPITAL-BASED POPULATION HEALTH
INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 110, at 12.
300. See supra notes 202–203 and accompanying text.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol33/iss2/1

60

Mantel: Tackling the Social Determinants Of Health: A Central Role For Providers

2017]

TACKLING SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH

277

are partnering with other sectors to target the community’s high rate
of diabetes.301 In addition, Hennepin Health, a Medicaid ACO in
Minnesota comprised of an HMO, academic medical center,
federally-qualified clinics, and the local public health department,
works with homeless shelters, county jails, supportive housing
providers, and others to meet the “total” needs of its patients.302
While these and similar efforts certainly are a promising
development, most are modest in scope and scale.303 This may be due
to the various obstacles impeding the emergence of mature PHPs that
fully integrate participating organizations’ resources and expertise
across a broad range of activities and health issues.
Current payment reforms and CHNA policies may do too little to
nudge providers to join PHPs. For the reasons discussed in Part
IV.A., the financial incentives under current payment reforms simply
may be too weak to entice providers to participate in a PHP’s broad
scale, community-level initiatives. Among tax-exempt hospitals,
uncertainty over whether the IRS would count a hospital’s
participation in collaborative efforts as a community benefit activity
“may [further] sap a hospital’s enthusiasm” for PHPs,304 particularly
if the collaboration benefits individuals outside the geographic area
used by the hospital for meeting its community benefit standards.
Tax-exempt hospitals face additional legal uncertainty if their
specific contribution to the PHP departs from traditional forms of

301. See AUSTEN BIOINNOVATION INST. IN AKRON, HEALTHIER BY DESIGN: CREATING
ACCOUNTABLE CARE COMMUNITIES: A FRAMEWORK FOR ENGAGEMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY (2012),
http://faegrebdc.com/webfiles/accwhitepaper12012v5final.pdf.
302. See Somers & McGinnis, supra note 299 (discussing Hennepin Health); CRAWFORD ET AL.,
supra note 29, at 9.
303. See CRAWFORD ET AL., supra note 29, at 6 (“Few models exist that successfully integrate clinical
health care with social, public health, and/or community-based interventions like housing assistance,
food access, early childhood education, and environmental protection.”); Somers & McGinnis, supra
note 299 (“[F]ew [Medicaid ACOs] are close to achieving the scope of services combined with the
depth of financial responsibility needed.”); Mays & Scutchfield, supra note 217, at 1 (“We found that
the types of partnerships likely to have the largest and most direct effects on population health are
among the most difficult, and therefore least prevalent, forms of collaboration. High opportunity costs
and weak and diffuse participation incentives hinder partnerships that focus on expanding effective
prevention programs and policies.”).
304. See Crossley, supra note 107, at 105–106.
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community benefit, such as collecting and analyzing data in support
of the PHP’s activities.305
Cultural barriers also may hinder the development of mature
PHPs. The business considerations that influence many providers
may not mesh with the public service orientation of government
agencies and community organizations.306 Moreover, relative to
provider-based SDH initiatives, PHPs are “messier,” and providers
may be reluctant to cede some control to other collaborators.307 In
addition, providers who view themselves as competitors may be less
than enthusiastic about participating in PHPs involving multiple
providers. Mary Crossley also has noted that hospitals commonly
view aspects of their community benefit programs as proprietary
information, and this “competitive mindset” may make them
unwilling to share information as part of a PHP.308 Providers’ general
reticence to share information considered proprietary likewise may
diminish their willingness to collaborate with other sectors, including
the public health sector.309 The PHP’s internal financing
arrangements also must ensure that any cost savings or financial
rewards derived from the participating organizations’ collective
efforts are allocated across all organizations; otherwise, some
organizations will not have sufficient resources to cover their costs or
305. See id.; see also Janet Corrigan, Elliott Fisher & Scott Heiser, Hospital Community Benefit
Programs, 313 JAMA 1211, 1211–12 (2015) (noting that ambiguities as to the requirements under
community benefit laws and regulations, particularly regarding which community building investments
count as community benefits, may be barriers to regional coordination).
306. Cf. Ingram, Scutchfield & Costich, supra note 116, at 842 (stating that among the cultural and
practical barriers to ACO-public health partnerships cited by respondents surveyed by the authors, “the
most commonly cited barrier was the business orientation of the accountable care organization model”).
307. See Crossley, supra note 107, at 105–106 (discussing hospitals’ reluctance to engage in
collaborative efforts as part of meeting their CHNA obligations).
308. See id. at 104. Crossley’s concerns find support in attempts to establish regional health
information exchanges that allow for sharing of electronic patient data across providers, with many
efforts hindered by providers’ reluctance to share patient data with competing providers. See Julia
Adler-Milstein, David W. Bates & Ashish K. Jha, U.S. Regional Health Information Organizations:
Progress and Challenges, 28 HEALTH AFF. 483, 489 (2009) (reporting that approximately 40 percent of
regional health information organizations (RHIOs) identified “stakeholder concerns about competition”
as both a planning and operational barrier to the development of RHIOs); Joy M. Grossman, Thomas S.
Bodenheimer & Kelly McKenzie, Hospital-Physician Portals: The Role of Competition In Driving
Clinical Data Exchange, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1629, 1634–35 (2006) (explaining how competition has been
a barrier to communitywide data sharing).
309. See Crossley, supra note 107, at 104.
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will have little economic incentive to continue their participation in a
PHP.310 Reaching accord on this issue among participating
organizations, however, may prove challenging.311
On a more practical level, successful PHPs require a shared
infrastructure that supports exchanging data across participating
organizations and tracking of health outcomes.312 Sharing data can
enhance each participating organization’s performance of its
respective functions.313 For example, receiving clinical data from
providers could support public health departments in their
surveillance activities, including identifying chronic disease trends
suggesting a need for public health interventions.314 Providers
seeking to link their patients with community resources would
benefit from access to real-time information on the assistance
available through local social services organizations and tracking
their patients’ encounters with these organizations.315 And having
access to relevant medical information, such as current medications,
could help homeless shelters and other social services organizations
better serve their clients.316 Unfortunately at present various barriers
impede cross-sector data sharing, including concerns about the
security and privacy of individual data, fear of violating federal and
state privacy laws, incompatible data systems, limited information
technology capability among social services and community

310. See Elliott S. Fisher & Janet Corrigan, Accountable Health Communities: Getting There from
Here, 312 JAMA 2093, 2093 (2014).
311. Cf. id. (noting that savings accrue to providers under new payment reform models, and that “[i]t
is far from clear how or if the reallocation to support needed investments in public health or social
services will occur”).
312. See MCGINNIS, CRAWFORD & SOMERS, supra note 293, at 1 (a necessary component for an
integrated system of health and social services is “quality measurement and data-sharing tools to track
outcomes and exchange information”); PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 105, at 5–6 (an
essential component of successful integration of primary care and public health is “the sharing and
collaborative use of data and analysis”).
313. See PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 105, at 74.
314. See id. at 30 (discussing the benefits of public health agencies incorporating data from
providers).
315. See Oanh Kleu Nguyen, et al., Envisioning a Social-Health Information Exchange as a Platform
to Support a Patient-Centered Medical Neighborhood: A Feasibility Study, 30 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
60, 65 (2015) (discussing the purposes for which data may be exchanged across sectors).
316. See id.
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organizations, and concerns about inadequate workforce training in
data privacy and security at nonprovider organizations.317
Finally, PHPs require financing mechanisms that support building
and sustaining the necessary infrastructure and reward all partnership
participants for improvements in the community’s health. PHPs often
rely on government and foundation grants to fund their start-up
costs.318 However, because grants, by their nature, are time-limited,
sustaining a PHP requires alternative sources of continuous,
dependable revenue streams.319 Ideally these alternative financial
arrangements also would reward PHPs that improve their
community’s health—and perhaps penalize those who do not—
because the potential for financial rewards creates stronger incentives
for providers to participate in PHPs. At present, few sustainable
funding models have been put into practice,320 although
commentators have proposed various financing mechanisms for
PHPs.321 For example, a PHP that successfully reduces its
317. See id. at 63–65; PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 105, at 26; CRAWFORD ET
supra note 29, at 14.
318. See Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 832 (“Government and foundation grants can help fund the
start-up costs of population health organizations . . . .”). An emerging alternative funding mechanism for
a PHP’s start-up costs is social impact bonds (SIBs). See BUTLER, GRABINSKY & MASI, supra note 159,
at 15.With SIBs, private investors provide funding to a public agency in support of specific initiatives.
See id. Whether and to what extent the private investor receives back its investment and a return on
investment is tied to whether measurable social outcomes are achieved. See id.
319. See Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 832 (explaining that although grants can cover start-up
costs, cross-sector population health partnerships can only if succeed if “sustainable—that is, [they]
have reliable ongoing sources of funding”); ALPER & BACIU, supra note 72, at 9 (“‘We need to move
beyond grants and short-term appropriations and move to dependable formula sources . . . .’” (quoting
David Kindig)).
320. See PRIMARY CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 105, at 34 (“[T]he sustainability and
scalability of models of [cross-sector] integration have been lacking. The key task now is to focus on the
challenge of sustainable implementation of community-based models of primary care and public health
integration. Critical elements for this take are providing sustains resources and incentives for these
models . . . .”).
321. Long-term funding models for PHPs include:
 Population-level shared savings, where the PHP would be subject to a community-wide
population health budget and would receive a portion of any savings its members’ collected
efforts generate for payors.
 Similar to pay-for-performance payment methodologies, rewarding a PHP for meeting
community-wide population health targets, such as reducing obesity, reducing hospital
readmissions, or lowering premature birth rates. This could be linked to shared savings
payments made to a PHP under a population-level shared savings program, with the level of
shared savings adjusted upward (or downward) for meeting (or failing to meet) communitywide population health targets.
AL.,
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community’s hospital admissions rate could be rewarded with a share
of the resulting savings for the Medicare and state Medicaid
programs, with the PHP then allocating the bonus across participating
organizations.322
To make the PHP vision a reality, policymakers must put in place
policies and infrastructure that would support providers and other
organizations combining their resources and expertise across a broad
range of population health activities.323 Fortunately, a handful of
states have begun to do just that.324 For example, Oregon’s state
Medicaid program has established regional Coordinated Care
Organizations (CCOs)—partnerships among providers, local public
health departments, community members, and other stakeholders that
have a global budget and are accountable for the cost and quality of
care provided to Medicaid beneficiaries.325 In Minnesota, Medicaid
ACOs known as Integrated Health Partnerships are expected to
develop coordinated service delivery models that address SDHs at
the community level.326 And in Colorado, policymakers are working
toward “a future in which most care for most Coloradans will be
provided through coordinated systems of care that integrate physician
and behavioral health services and connect public health agencies,
 Payors such as Medicare and Medicaid directly paying for nonclinical programs that address
social determinants of health, such as housing services.
 Capitated payments that would be used by the PHP to purchase both clinical and nonclinical
services for patients.
See Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 830 (describing risk-adjusted community-wide population health
budgets); Ingram, Scutchfield & Costich, supra note 116, at 842 (discussing global payment models);
BUTLER, GRABINSKY & MASI, supra note 159, at 14 (suggesting that the federal government grant
Medicaid waivers that would allow state Medicaid programs to use their funds for services such as
housing and education); MCGINNIS, CRAWFORD & SOMERS, supra note 293, at 5 (discussing different
payment models); Shortell, supra note 293, at 1 (proposing risk-adjusted population-wide payments).
322. See, e.g., Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 831 (describing risk-adjusted community-wide
population health budgets); CRAWFORD ET AL., supra note 29, at 5 (describing a population-level shared
savings model).
323. See Braunstein & Lavizzo-Mourey, supra note 29, at 2049 (“The challenge is to move to moreintegrated systems that can support broad-scale accomplishments and that will be energized by shared
learning and strengthened by connections across people, projects, and evaluation and research
activities.”).
324. See CRAWFORD ET AL., supra note 29, at 10 (describing Oregon’s CCOs); About Coordinated
Care Organizations, OR. HEALTH AUTH., https://cco.health.oregon.gov/Pages/AboutUs.aspx.
325. See id.
326. See id. at 9 (describing Minnesota’s ACO demonstration).
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clinical care delivery systems and community organizations to
achieve population health goals.”327 At the federal level, the Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Services supports state and local
demonstration projects that test “new financing models that allow for
savings from upstream interventions that address social determinants
of health to be shared across health care providers and agencies
delivering social services.”328 CMS also recently announced a new
grant initiative to test collaborations between providers and other
sectors, which CMS refers to as the “Accountable Health
Communities Model.”329 In addition, the Office of the National
Coordinator, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has
begun examining whether policy changes are needed to support
cross-sector data sharing among organizations participating in
PHPs.330 The knowledge gained from these early initiatives can be
used to develop policies that support the successful implementation
of mature PHPs across the nation.
CONCLUSION
Despite growing recognition that social, environmental, and
behavioral factors profoundly impact an individual’s health,
policymakers are unlikely to increase public funding for programs
that directly address the social determinants of health. Fortunately,
the health care system has begun to fill this void. In response to
various reforms enacted under the Affordable Care Act, health care
providers are paying more attention to the social determinants of
327. CORRIGAN & FISHER, supra note 185, at 6.
328. Dietz et al., supra note 293, at 1460. For a description of the grants awarded by CMS, see
generally State Innovation Models Initiative: General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/state-innovations/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
329. See Accountable Health Communities Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/AHCM (last visited Feb. 5, 2016) (announcing grants to test the
Accountable Health Communities Model).
330. On June 2, 2015, the Office of the National Coordinator’s Advanced Health Models and
Meaningful Use Workgroup held a public hearing exploring these issues. See Policy: Advanced Health
Models and Meaningful Use Workgroup Public Hearing, HEALTHIT (Sep. 8, 2015),
https://www.healthit.gov/facas/calendar/2015/06/02/policy-advanced-health-models-and-meaningfuluse-workgroup-public-hearing.
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health. Many providers have adopted innovative approaches that
address nonclinical conditions that contribute to poor health, such as
patient-centered medical homes, medical legal partnerships, and
helping patients procure public benefits and community-based
support.
Thus far, these efforts have been modest.331 With the traditional
biomedical paradigm deeply ingrained in the current medical culture,
many providers have not yet expanded their orientation to include the
social determinants of health. Among those who have, most are at an
early point on the learning curve.332 Moreover, providers’ efforts to
address the social determinants of health are narrowly focused on
interventions that produce near-term improvements in the health of
individual patients. This is not surprising, as providers at present
generally lack the incentives and capacity to take primary
responsibility for improving the long-term health of the broader
population residing in their geographic areas.
With much to be gained from providers addressing the social
determinants of health, regulators must do more to strengthen
providers’ incentives and capacity to do so. As an initial step,
regulators should adopt policies that push more providers to address
their individual patients’ most pressing nonclinical needs. For
example, the Medicare and Medicaid programs could adopt payment
methodologies that reward concrete actions that address the social
determinants of health, such as paying bonuses to providers who
assist their asthmatic patients with eliminating mold and other risk
factors in their homes. The federal government and states also could
expand current programs that support providers transitioning to
patient care models that address both clinical and nonclinical needs,
such as the patient-centered medical home. Providers likewise would
331. See Casalino et al., supra note 205, at 830 (“Overall, serious efforts by ACOs and hospitals to
have an impact on the socioeconomic determinants of health appear to be modest.”).
332. See ALPER & BACIU, supra note 72, at 14 (commenting that hospital are “still early on the
learning and action curve” with respect to practices that involve investing in population health); Noble
& Casalino, supra note 168, at 1119 (noting that “[m]any ACOs appear to interpret their responsibility
for population health in medical terms—that is responsibility to provide preventive care for all their
patients and care management for their patients with serious chronic diseases,” and that this “falls far
short of working to improve the health of the population in a geographic area”).
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benefit from publicly funded research that helps them identify most
efficient and effective ways to ameliorate the social impediments to
good health.
Ultimately, providers will find greater success in addressing the
social determinants of health if they join Population Health
Partnerships—coalitions among organizations from different sectors
working collaboratively to improve their communities’ health.
Unfortunately, various challenges impede the development of
Population Health Partnerships, including a lack of both sustainable
financing models and infrastructure supporting the electronic
exchange of data across sectors. Health policy analysts must develop
a deeper understanding of these challenges and adopt policies that
lower the barriers to Population Health Partnerships.
The emerging trend of providers addressing the social
determinants of health is a promising development that should be
celebrated. But if the United States wishes to effect long-lasting,
meaningful improvement in the population’s health, the health care
system eventually must evolve from one centered around providers
diagnosing and treating patients to one that fully integrates the
medical, public health, and social services sectors. This health care
system of the future would not only meet patients’ immediate
medical needs, but also would advance the population’s health by
addressing the root causes of poor health.
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